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The internationalisation of the euro is in its initial stages and 
it is still difficult to draw any definitive conclusions regarding its 
scope and its implications for Latin America. Indeed, the 
emergence of an internationally used currency is slow and subject 
to inertial forces. Nonetheless, several fairly robust conclusions 
can be inferred from the results of the document.  
The most plausible medium- to long-term international 
scenario seems to be development of an asymmetrical duopoly 
between the euro and the dollar. In a context of scant international 
monetary cooperation, this scenario could lead to high volatility 
between the two main international currencies, which will be a 
powerful destabilising factor for third countries. In terms of 
official international reserves, the growing financial use of the 
single European currency and the development of Euroland capital 
markets should lead to greater diversification in favour of the euro 
in the medium and long term. 
Together with other factors, the growth of the euro bond 
market will tend to increase the pressure to widen and deepen the 
euro financial market and make it more liquid. This should favour 
the development of better conditions for both European and 
third-country participants. The geographic diversification strategy 
implemented by the European banks, and the boom in European 
foreign direct investment could also favour greater international 
use of the euro. 
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For Latin America, the sustained increase in the share of euro-denominated international 
bond issues, chiefly by the public sector, makes it necessary to consider policies for managing the 
currency composition of the external debt. On the other hand, the medium- to long-term 
consequences of an increasingly bipolar but asymmetrical international monetary system will have 
to be included in the Latin America national exchange rate policies, enhancing the possibility of 
adopting anchor baskets. 
 




The creation and introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999, is 
one of the most important economic events of the end of the twentieth 
century. The materialization of the European Monetary Union, the 
decisive stage in a protracted process of economic integration, 
introduces major transformations in international monetary and 
financial relations. The economic weight of the zone of issue—that is 
to say, the twelve countries that currently comprise “Euroland"—and 
the determination of the European authorities not to obstruct the 
internationalization of the new currency raise the likelihood that the 
advent of the euro may lead to substantial changes in the international 
monetary system (IMS). 
Latin America is not noted for its strong links with the euro 
zone. Latin America’s indisputable reference currency is the U.S. 
dollar. Nonetheless, the considerable weight of the economic ties 
between many of the countries of Latin America and Europe, and the 
interest that the process of creating the European Monetary Union has 
stimulated, suggest two lines of analysis. 
On the one hand, Europe’s movement toward monetary union 
has been a source of experience for Latin America for a number of 
years. Even though it is not possible to simply transplant an 
experience that is essentially unique, an analysis of the logical 
sequence and the convergence criteria adopted by the European Union 
can be very useful to the different Latin America regional groups 
(Chapters from SELA, 1998; Giambiagi, 1999; Heyman, 1999; Irela, 
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1999; Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 1999a; Zalher, 1999). Interest in the process followed in 
Europe is further reinforced because it has taken place in a context where the dominant principle of 
“one country, one currency” is increasingly called into question (Alesina and Barro, 2000). On this 
basis, and looking beyond the diversity of exchange relationships already existing in the region, the 
medium and long-term options for Latin American countries seem to be polarising between the 
prospect of total dollarisation and participation in a regional monetary union. All this tends to 
strengthen interest in the European experience (see, for example, Dornbusch, 1999, and García 
Herrero and Glöckler, 2000). 
On the other hand, the probable direct and indirect effects of the euro on economic relations 
between Europe and Latin America are also provoking increasing interest. To analyse the impact of 
the new European currency on other regions of the world in prospective terms is a complex task. 
First of all, the euro will have effects on the member countries of the European monetary union that 
are not easy to foresee and that will strongly influence the progress the new currency can achieve in 
international transactions. (One example concerns the effects of the euro on the development of the 
financial markets within the euro zone.) In addition, the effects of the euro in third countries will 
depend on the scope of the internationalization of the new currency. It is this dimension that we 
have chosen as the main thrust of this paper, although of course we do not propose to cover all 
aspects of this vast issue. The study will focus on the characteristics of the internationalization 
process of the euro and on identifying the transmission channels through which the new 
eurocurrency can exert influence in Latin America, with special emphasis on the analysis of 
European-Latin American financial relations. 
This choice seems to be justified. As has already been mentioned, the impact of the euro on 
European-Latin American relations will mainly be felt through financial rather than commercial 
channels (Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 1999c)1. Indeed, most Latin American countries are noted 
for a high degree of financial openness that increases their vulnerability vis-à-vis changes in the 
direction of international capital flows. In addition, the development of the financial functions of 
the euro will very probably represent a decisive factor in the internationalization of the single 
European currency. 
Monetary history shows that the emergence of key currencies—i.e. internationally used 
currencies—is a slow process because it is subject to inertia of various sorts. The inertia is 
particularly strong with regard to the unit of account and medium-of-payment functions of the 
currency. Conversely, the internationalization of a reference currency can progress more rapidly 
when it is used in financial functions. In the case of the euro, this was observed in some analyses 
made before the eurocurrency actually emerged. Several papers have highlighted the possibility of 
a greater use of the euro in financial operations as well as the impact this can have on the 
development of the IMS (Bergstein, 1997; Mc Cauley, 1997; Portes and Rey, 1998; Artus 2000a). 
A greater use of the euro by private agents in financing operations (investment and borrowing) 
could be the channel through which to progress toward an increasingly bipolar IMS. 
The first two years of existence of the euro appear to confirm these analyses. The initial 
stage of the new currency has been characterized by a significant expansion of euro-denominated 
international bond issues and the emergence of the eurocurrency as a borrowing currency (Detken 
and Hartmann, 2000; BCE, 2000; BIS, 2000; BIS 2001b; Galati and Tsatsaronis, 2001). 
Latin America has played an important role in the expansion of the euro-denominated bond 
market. This has been one facet of the intensification of financial relations between Europe and 
Latin America. These relations have also been characterized by a boom in direct foreign investment 
                                                     
1 Other studies that consider the implications of the creation of the euro for the group of developing countries also stress the 
preeminence of financial channels over commercial ones (for example Cohen, 2000). 
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(FDI) of European origin, the growing presence of euro-zone banks in Latin America and a 
sustained increase in European bank loans toward the region, all of which was clearly perceptible 
during the nineteen nineties. 
The intensification of financial relations has many implications in the medium and long term. 
This study will deal mainly with one of the aspects that have not been examined very closely up to 
now: the repercussion on Latin American exchange regimes. This involves considering the 
perspectives of the eurocurrency in terms of its unit-of-account function. This function is not 
limited to the "price-setting" of international trade; it also has to do with the use of the international 
currencies as anchors for monetary and exchange policies (Bénassy-Quéré and Coeuré, 2000). In 
this context, we will examine the perspectives of the Latin American countries on the basis of an 
analysis of the conditions for generalizing the use of the euro as a single anchor currency or as part 
of a basket of currencies. 
The study is organized in four sections. The first evaluates the initial steps of the euro and its 
internationalization in general terms, which enables us to formulate hypotheses about likely 
scenarios for the development of the IMS. The second analyses in greater depth the factors that will 
have a bearing on the internationalization of the European currency. The third section examines the 
channels through which the euro will exert an influence in Latin America on the basis of the recent 
development of relations between the two regions, looking at trade flows and, most importantly, 
financial flows. The final section applies an econometric analysis to 93 economies, on the basis of 
which we study the real and financial determinants of the options selected by developing countries 
in terms of de facto anchoring, and make a prospective analysis of the ways the euro can come to 
be used as an anchor currency in Latin America. The conclusion summarizes the main findings. 
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I. The euro and the IMS 
The appearance of the euro on the international scene marks the 
beginning of a new era in international monetary and financial 
relations. The deepening process of integration that began in the 1950s 
and the creation of the euro represent decisive steps in the long road 
toward a truly common European market. At the same time, given the 
economic weight of "Euroland" and the will demonstrated by the 
European authorities, the advent of the euro opens up the possibility of 
instituting a new international currency capable of competing with the 
dollar. The scenario that seems most plausible, i.e., an increasing but 
gradual bipolarisation of the IMS, is very likely to give rise to greater 
exchange-rate volatility unless the U.S. and European authorities 
implement a strengthened monetary cooperation, which does not for 
the moment seem to be on the horizon. 
1. The euro, an international currency: 
overview 
If we compare the relative weights of the United States and the 
euro zone in the world economy, we can see that the euro zone has a 
greater weight in terms of population. At the same time, the weights of 
the euro zone and the United States are similar in terms of 
international trade, as shown in table 1. 




WEIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE EURO ZONE 
 IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 




 (1) (2) (2) % GDP (3) 
Euro Zone 302.80 5875.60 3709.80 56.80 19.00 
United States 273.70 8590.10 11596.50 121.50 14.80 
Japan 126.80 4223.20 2263.40 48.20 9.90 
(1) Millions of inhabitants (2000) (2) Billions of dollars (2001) 
(3) Exports/GDP in % (2000) 
Source: World Bank, Eurostat, OECD 
On the other hand, if we adopt GDP and stock exchange capitalization as criteria, the weight 
of the U.S. is greater. These basic statistical data can lead us to consider that the euro has a 
strong potential to increase its share as an internationally used currency in the world 
economy. 
Another relevant factor to be considered is the position of the European authorities with 
regard to the internationalization of the euro. Knowing that history and economic theory show that 
progress in the international use of a currency has to be gradual, the European officials are not 
actively seeking to promote the internationalization of the euro. Unlike Japan, however, which has 
also resisted internationalizing the use of the yen (because the japanese consider that it might 
disrupt the behavior of their monetary policy), the European authorities do not oppose a growing 
internationalization of the euro. Their position is that the zone's strategy in terms of monetary 
policy is sufficiently strong to face the implications of an increasing internationalization of the 
eurocurrency (Duisemberg, 2000). Their position is, therefore, "neutral", and this in fact favors an 
increasing international use of the euro. 
2. The euro in the international scenario: a difficult beginning 
Contrary to the predictions of a majority of specialists, the euro weakened substantially 
during its initial stages, and lost almost 30% of its value in the first few years of its existence. 
Three main groups of factors have been suggested to explain this: 
First of all, economic factors. A gap has developed between the U.S. economy, which has 
been experiencing an exceptionally prosperous phase, and the euro zone, whose growth cycle 
began later and has been less strong. One of the consequences of this situation is an interest-rate 
differential that favors the dollar. 
Secondly, financial factors, of a more structural nature. Although the U.S. is a major net 
importer of capital, the euro zone has been experiencing net outflows of long-term capital 
(portfolio investment and direct foreign investment) that far exceed their current-account surpluses 
since 1994. The U.S. has a growing current-account deficit (over 4% of GDP), with a favorable 
basic balance thanks to massive capital inflows. In turn, the euro zone has a current-account surplus 
(around 0.5% of GDP) together with an unfavorable basic balance due to this significant outflow of 
capital. The deepening European integration and the creation of the euro have contributed in part to 
this situation. European companies have been pressed to increase their critical size, which has led 
to mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. market (which is also the epicenter of the new economy). 
Moreover, European companies have begun to participate increasingly in the movement to achieve 
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geographic diversification of their security portfolios: between 1998 and 2000 the volume of net 
purchases of foreign stock doubled. 
Thirdly, institutional factors. The implementation of the EMU has not clarified the situation 
in terms of economic governance of the euro zone. Uncertainty still reigns on many levels, and 
from the viewpoint of foreign investors, the European Central Bank's policy is far from clear. This 
latter factor will probably be long-lasting; the strengthening of the European monetary authority 
entails a slow learning process. 
Nevertheless, the recent nominal depreciation of the euro arose from the fact that the dollar 
was undervalued at the time the eurocurrency was created. In effect, most of the studies conducted 
on the basis of a fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (developed by Williamson, 1983), indicate 
that on the date the euro was introduced, it was overvalued vis-à-vis the dollar by an estimated 7% 
to 10% (Borowski and Couharde, 1999; Teïletche, 2001). 
The definition of an equilibrium exchange rate is, however, complex: the short term is 
dominated by the cycle, the medium term by the savings behavior of the issuing zones, and the long 
term reflects the external positions of the two currency zones (Artus, 1999), as well as the 
difference in their potential growth rates. 
This last point is crucial: a medium- and long-term source of uncertainty has to do with the 
ability of the European economy to draw nearer to the potential growth rate of the U.S. economy. A 
major portion of the studies on this subject show that the long-term trend in the growth rate of the 
euro zone is between 2.5% and 3%, while that of the United States is close to 4%. Even though the 
higher internal savings rate and the usually positive current-account balance of the euro zone tend 
to weaken the dollar, a persistent differential in terms of potential growth works against the 
strengthening of the euro in the long term. 
Another factor of uncertainty in the medium term arises from the behavior of savings and 
investment in Europe. As we have seen, the euro zone is characterized by a current-account surplus, 
which is a reflection of surplus savings. This surplus is a result of the existence of substantial 
private savings, which are higher than the public deficits. This European configuration is just the 
opposite to that of the United States, which is characterized by a shortfall in savings in spite of its 
fiscal surplus. 
One can foresee that the overall saving rate in the euro zone will continue to be high for two 
main reasons. First, the reduction of fiscal deficits is an objective of the countries of the zone. 
Second, it is expected that households will increase their savings efforts for demographic reasons 
(ageing population and pension funding). From this point of view, the development of financial 
markets linked to the creation of the euro should stimulate the accumulation of these financial 
savings. 
In principle, the abundance of savings in the euro zone should favor the appreciation of the 
eurocurrency. European savings, however, may be insufficient if the companies of the zone 
increase their investment in Europe in order to reduce their relative lag vis-à-vis the U.S. (in 
particular in the new economy). If this takes place, the euro zone might even experience a major 
current-account deficit (Artus, 2001), which could contribute to weakening the eurocurrency. 
3. The international role of the euro and the IMS 
Although they are different issues, the movement of the euro exchange rate and the 
perspectives for the euro's role in the international sphere are not unconnected. If the euro 
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depreciates permanently and there is skepticism concerning its parity, this could discourage its use 
and might affect its acceptance among the key IMS currencies. 
In any event, many authors expect a rise of the euro as an international currency. A majority 
of these studies emphasize that the financial role of the euro (that is to say, as a borrowing and 
lending currency) will develop much more rapidly than its international trade function (i.e. as an 
invoicing currency). This is confirmed by the two first years of the euro's life, in particular with 
regard to its role as a borrowing currency, which has developed significantly. This is a distinctive 
characteristic of the present internationalization of the euro that will be analyzed later on. 
On the other hand, some authors indicate that the progress of the "trade" euro might occur in 
"steps", with qualitative leaps, that should quicken the internationalization of the eurocurrency (de 
Boissieu, 2000) (figure 1). The same authors, however, also argue that an excessive delay in the 
development of the trade function of the euro could work against the establishment of its financial 
role: a "complete" international currency should not be subject to excessive or too protracted a 
divergence between its financial and trade roles. 
Figure 1 
THEORETICAL PATH OF THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE EURO 
Error! Not a valid link. 
Source: de Boissieu (2000) 
With regard to the evolution of the IMS in the medium to long term, it is possible to 
distinguish at least three scenarios. The first is an IMS that will long continue to be dominated by 
the dollar, which implies that the initial progress observed in terms of the financial function of the 
euro will be followed by back sliding and that the eurocurrency will fail to win definitive 
acceptance on that role. Second is the exact opposite scenario: the financial function of the euro 
becomes firmer and its trade role develops at a faster than expected rate. This would lead to an 
increasingly symmetrical dollar-euro duopoly. The last and seemingly most plausible scenario, 
taking into account the first steps of the euro in the international arena and the teachings of 
economic theory, is a duopoly that gradually decreases in asymmetry. A slow but growing 
bipolarization of the IMS, however, also entails the development of the euro’s role as an anchor 
currency in the exchange systems of other countries. 
Within the framework of this most likely scenario, it seems clear that the volatility of the 
dollar-euro exchange rate is unlikely to decrease. On the contrary, as suggested by theoreticians on 
the role of leadership (such as Kindleberger), asymmetry and the existence of a clearly hegemonic 
currency are conditions that favor stability. Historic experience shows that the co-existence of two 
dominant currencies (as occurred with the pound and the dollar in the 1930s) can be a destabilizing 
element and lead to unfavorable effects in third countries. 
Let us analyze the hypothetical reaction of the euro-dollar exchange rate to a trade shock that 
affects the Euroland/dollar bilateral current account under three possible scenarios for anchoring 
the currencies of third countries to the key currencies of the system: (1) general flotation where no 
currency is anchored to the dollar or the euro; (2) a hegemonic system in which all currencies 
except the euro are anchored to the dollar; and (3) a bipolar system in which both the U.S. and the 
euro zone conduct half their trade with the countries of their respective monetary blocs. We see that 
the hegemonic system, although less stable than the general flotation system, is in turn much less 
volatile than a bipolar IMS (Benassy-Quéré and Coeuré, 2000). 
Thus the current situation, set between the hegemonic and bipolar systems (i.e. an IMS in 
harmony with the increasingly bipolar but asymmetrical medium- to long-term scenario we see as 
most likely) entails high volatility between the two main international currencies. 
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Prior to examining the first steps of the internationalization of the euro in greater depth, it is 
useful to indicate that, within the framework of a growing bipolarization of the IMS, we can 
foresee two possible configurations regarding the volatility of the euro-dollar parity. On one hand, 
a "pessimistic" configuration of "competition" between the dollar and the euro, in which the U.S. 
and European monetary authorities continue to give priority to their domestic objectives and are 
uncooperative toward each other, which would accentuate the instability of the bilateral parity. On 
the other, an "optimistic" configuration of strengthened monetary "co-operation": the U.S. and 
European authorities consider that international monetary stability is a public commodity and agree 
to intervene and monitor the evolution of their exchange rates, and to progress toward coordinating 
their macroeconomic policies. In this configuration, the volatility of the euro-dollar exchange rate 
would decline. 
The former configuration appears to be most likely. While the IMS is in its current 
intermediate situation, it is difficult to imagine the U.S. being willing to give lower priority to its 
domestic objectives. On the other hand, the deficiencies in the institutional architecture of the 
EMU, including the absence of a unified political authority, makes it difficult to think that Europe 
could defend a coherent macroeconomic policy on an international scale. In any event, it is clear 
that the European monetary authorities do not have an explicit objective on the subject of the 
exchange rate and seem to be increasingly inclined to practice a policy of "benign neglect" as long 
as the degree of external openness of the euro zone is less than that of their member countries 
considered individually. 
Empirical analysis (see box 1) confirms these hypotheses. As shown in table 2 and figure 2, 
the euro/dollar exchange rate has become more volatile since the introduction of the eurocurrency. 
Table 2 
VOLATILITY OF THE EURO/DOLLAR PARITY 
(annual and quarterly averages based on daily data) 




1998 5.20 5.23 5.84 
1999 6.47 6.61 7.04 
2000 9.99 9.50 8.78 
Q1 2001 10.89 10.43 9.90 
Source: Authors' calculations 




ANNUALIZED VOLATILITY OF EURO/DOLLAR PARITY 



































1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001












METHOD FOR CALCULATING THE ANNUALISED VOLATILITY 
The data used are taken from the spot quotations in the New York market at their closing price. 
We have used the exchange rate of the German mark between 01/01/1971 and 31/12/1998 and 
the exchange rate of the euro between 01/01/1999 and 11/05/2001. 
As of the introduction of the euro on 1/01/1999, this currency was converted to German marks 
using the conversion rate established for the member countries of the monetary union. 





















 ix  = daily quotation 
  i    = day 
 n  = number of monthly quotations 
 σ  is multiplied by 100 in accordance with financial standards 
On the basis of the volatility data calculated as shown above, a five-month moving average was 
calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott method2 in order to eliminate the strong fluctuations in 
the volatility and its trend. 
 
                                                     
2 This is a smoothing method that is widely used among macro-economists to obtain a smooth estimate of the long-term trend 
component of a series. The method was first used in a working paper (circulated in the early 1980s and published in 1997) by 
Hodrick and Prescott to analyse post-war U.S. business cycles. 
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II. Internationalization of the euro: 
importance of the financial 
dimension 
The impact of the creation of the euro on international monetary 
relations will depend largely on the degree of internationalization of 
the European monetary unit. It is useful, therefore, to begin by 
distinguishing between the different private and public uses of 
currencies at an international level, and then present the conditions 
required to achieve the internationalization of a currency as they are 
formulated and analyzed in the economic literature. This will make it 
possible to use these analytical tools to evaluate the extent to which 
the euro is likely to become an internationally used currency. 
1. Theoretical framework 
1.1. A typology of the international use of 
currencies 
On the basis of the typology proposed by Krugman (1991) and 
following the presentation made by Bénassy-Quéré, Mojon and Schor 
(1998), we can distinguish six types of international uses of a currency 
as a function of a twofold criterion: (1), the three traditional functions 
of currencies, and (2) the private and public use of currencies on an 
international scale (table 3). 




INTERNATIONAL USES OF A CURRENCY 
Function Private use Public use 
Medium of exchange Means of payment / vehicle 
currency 
Intervention currency 
Unit of account Price-setting / invoicing currency Reference currency (anchor) 
Store of value Investment and financing 
currency 
Reserve currency 
Source: Krugman (1991) 
An international currency is used by non-residents as a medium of exchange in trade 
transactions and capital movements. Private agents use an international currency as a vehicle, i.e. as 
an intermediary between two second-ranking currencies. Thus, transactions between Brazil and 
Thailand are broken up into two separate moments: real/dollar and dollar/baht. In turn, monetary 
authorities also use international currencies as a medium of payment in their interventions in 
foreign-exchange markets. 
Secondly, an international currency is used as a unit of account by private agents to invoice 
their trade or financial international transactions. This function is different from that of a medium 
of payment in the sense that one transaction can be denominated in one currency and then paid in 
another (distinction between invoicing currency and medium of payment). Monetary authorities 
also make use of the unit-of-account function in implementing their exchange policies when they 
decide to anchor their currencies to an international reference currency. This has to do with 
exchange system issues. 
As a store of value, an international currency is used by private agents with the aim of 
preserving the value of their assets. They place their assets in different international currency 
denominations as part of their strategies to optimize their risk/yield ratio. In turn, monetary 
authorities manage the composition of their international reserves as a function both of their 
objective of optimizing their risk/yield ratio and of the nature of their interventions in the foreign-
exchange market. 
These different international uses of currencies are separable but interdependent. 
Schematically, the interaction between these different uses can move along various channels (see 
figure 3). For example, the decision adopted by the monetary authorities to give priority to certain 
currencies in the composition of international reserves (store-of-value function) can be conditioned 
in part by the choice of an anchoring mechanism with regard to these currencies (unit-of-account 
function). 



















Source: Bénassy-Quéré, Mojon and Schor (1998) 
 
Another channel has to do with transaction costs. If a currency is used as a vehicle currency, 
transaction costs are low and the monetary authorities will tend to use it in their interventions, 
while private investors will try to procure assets denominated in that currency. 
The degree of use of an international currency by a country can be very different depending 
on the above-mentioned functions: thus, the dollar may be chosen as the anchor currency by 
monetary authorities due to the overwhelming weight of the U.S. financial markets, even though 
the trade transactions of that same country may be denominated in other currencies. Likewise, it is 
possible to consider these functions hierarchically, i.e., the international medium of payment 
function is frequently considered to be the most important (Bourguinat, 1985). 
1.2. Conditions for the internationalization of a currency 
According to Bourguinat (1987), two criteria should be taken into account: 
• Stability—predictability of the currency; 
• Acceptability—liquidity: In order to be international, a currency must be universally 
accepted; it should be a "vehicle" currency, in the sense that it is used by other countries 
in transactions that do not involve a direct relationship with the issuing country. 
Tavlas (1991) proposes two complementary criteria: 
• The country issuing the international currency should have a major weight in 
international trade, thus reinforcing the use of this currency by the other countries. 
• The country issuing the international currency should have free, broad and deep financial 
markets, thus guaranteeing the liquidity of the currency and making it possible for the 
currency to play a store-of-value role for private and public participants. 
These conditions are necessary but not sufficient to explain the reasons why international 
operators tend to favor one currency as a key currency. Some authors emphasize the role of 
transaction costs, economy of scale phenomena, positive externalities (Kenen, 1992) and network 
effects (Aglietta & Deusy-Fournier, 1994). These approaches make it possible to demonstrate the 
existence of self-reinforcing and inertial processes in the international use of currencies. From this 
Euro and the financial.relations between Latin America and Europe 
 
22 
point of view, the progress of the euro as an international currency should be gradual. In other 
words, the dollar should maintain its supremacy for a long while yet. 
2. The internationalization process: different perspectives for 
different functions of the euro 
When the euro officially appeared on the scene, the dollar was by far the dominant 
international currency. The dollar is still, in fact, the most widely used medium of payment, and 
represents a decisive proportion (around 50%) of all transactions in the foreign-exchange markets. 
In 1999 the dollar represented over 60% of the international reserves of central banks, against 
slightly over 12% in the case of the euro (the yen was a distant third, with only 5% of the total)3. 
The hegemony of the U.S. currency has become even stronger in the last few years, representing 
almost 70% of international reserves in 2000, against the euro's slightly over 11% (table 4). 
Table 4 
CURRENCY COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN-EXCHANGE RESERVES, ALL COUNTRIES 
(In %) 
 
Dollar Euro Yen Sterling Swiss 
franc 
Others 
1999 Q1 63.80 12.64 5.03 3.73 0.64 14.15 
1999 Q2 64.44 11.97 4.74 3.74 0.63 14.47 
1999 Q3 63.92 12.14 5.09 3.76 0.62 14.48 
1999 Q4 63.91 11.78 5.13 3.71 0.60 14.87 
2000 Q1 64.13 11.93 5.21 3.73 0.64 14.36 
2000 Q2 64.11 11.76 4.98 3.62 0.64 14.89 
2000 Q3 69.04 11.43 5.01 3.60 0.63 10.29 
Source: Authors' calculations on IMF data 
With regard to invoicing of trade transactions, the dollar also plays a decisive role, 
representing around 45% of the total. Although the differences are less relevant if we consider the 
financial roles of the currencies, the dollar was also dominant on this level at the time the euro was 
introduced. Prior to the creation of the euro, 56% of all international bonds issues were 
denominated in dollars, while the eurocurrency share (i.e., the total of all its component currencies) 
was 36%, taking an average for the 1996-1998 period. 
As will be seen, the international role of the euro is expected to develop more rapidly in the 
sphere of financial transactions than in other types of transactions. 
2.1. Private use of the euro as a medium of payment and vehicle 
currency 
As previously mentioned, although the euro zone has a greater share than the U.S. in world 
exports of goods and services, the adoption of the euro as a medium of payment/vehicle currency 
will be a slow process. In fact, changes in exchange denomination practices generally take a long 
                                                     
3 It should be noted that the total international reserves in euros in the central banks of the Economic and Monetary Union are not 
comparable to the sum of the currencies that made up the single European currency. This is due to the fact that a portion of the 
reserves of the European central banks (for example, the francs held by the German central bank) was converted into domestic assets 
as a result of their transformation into euros. 
CEPAL – SERIE Macroeconomía del desarrollo No 13 
 
23 
time. In this sense, according to a study conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB, 1999), 
four factors could lead the euro to challenging—although certainly in the long term—the dollar’s 
predominance a medium of payment/vehicle currency: 
(1) All the markets in which the euro is used as a medium of payment/vehicle currency should tend 
to experience a reduction in transaction costs, which would increase the likelihood of using the 
euro for this purpose. In particular, non-residents who seek to protect themselves against 
exchange-rate risks should find new instruments denominated in euros in the euro zone's single 
foreign-exchange market. 
(2) Euro-zone agents are in a better position than in the past to require that the eurocurrency be 
used in their international transactions in order to limit exchange-rate risks. European exporters 
who up to now have used foreign currencies may progressively adopt the euro, their local 
currency, as a payment and invoicing currency vis-à-vis third countries. 
(3) Emerging and transition countries could be persuaded to use the euro to denominate and pay 
for their imports in order to balance their overall exchange-rate risk vis-à-vis the euro zone. 
Moreover, once they become familiar with the eurocurrency, economic agents in those 
countries could turn to the euro as a vehicle currency in their local transactions. 
(4) Transactions denominated in euros will, at a certain point, reach a threshold that will lead 
economic agents to feel increasingly inclined to use the euro as a medium of payment and 
vehicle currency. This trend should be accompanied by a reduction in transaction costs, thus 
favoring the continuation of the euro's internationalization process. 
2.2. Private use of the euro as a price-setting and invoicing 
currency 
Progress in this field is also expected to be slow, because it is subject to the same factors that 
determine the use of the euro as a medium of payment/vehicle currency. The international role of 
the euro here depends greatly on practices in the commodity and energy market, which are noted 
for their extensive use of the dollar. These practices evolve slowly due to the high degree of 
standardization and centralization of the markets. 
As mentioned previously, we cannot dismiss the possibility that the "trade" euro may 
progress in "steps", i.e. with qualitative leaps. Neither can we rule out the possibility that, in the not 
too distant future, European companies may begin to invoice their sales of industrial products to 
the rest of the world in euros (de Boissieu, 2000). 
2.3. Official use of the euro as a reserve, intervention and 
reference currency 
According to the ECB (1999), central banks tend to adopt a conservative position when 
managing the level and composition of their international reserves. Any change on this level, 
therefore, will be gradual. It is, however, likely that the central banks may be driven to more 
forward in this area for three main reasons: 
(1) The central banks may want to change the composition of their assets to take advantage 
of the diversification options offered by the euro. These policies may be stimulated by an increase 
in the liquidity and depth of the capital markets in euros, as discussed below. (2) Greater use of the 
euro by private agents should lead the central banks to use the euro as an intervention currency. (3) 
The euro will be used by the central banks of countries that wish to anchor their own currencies to 
the euro. 
With regard to the use of the euro as a reference currency, it is likely that a certain number of 
countries may, in future, decide to link their currencies—formally or informally—to the euro or to 
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a basket of currencies including the euro. This scenario involves, first of all, the countries that may 
wish to join the European Union over the next few years. It could also involve other emerging 
countries that seek to stabilize their currencies in relation to one or several reference currencies (we 
will return to this point in the fourth section). 
A recent study by Eichengreen and Mathieson (2000), which analyses the changes in the 
composition of the official international reserves of emerging countries, completes and confirms 
the above analysis. These authors show that the composition of international reserves is highly 
stable over time in terms of their main determinants: trade flows, financial flows and the foreign-
exchange system. The transformations observed are gradual, which suggests considerable inertia. 
After declining between 1970 and 1992, the dollar share of official reserves increased 
uninterruptedly until 1997. Symmetrically, the share of the yen and the European currencies 
declined during the 1990s. 
Econometric tests conducted by these authors show that the importance of the key currencies 
(dollar, mark and yen) in international reserves prior to the creation of the euro is increasingly a 
function of the weight of the issuing countries in trade and the proportion of the foreign debt 
denominated in these currencies. In addition, the stronger the anchorage of a country to one major 
currency, the greater the share of this currency in the country's reserves. Moreover, the econometric 
studies reveal a complementary relationship between the dollar and the mark, which suggests that 
these two currencies are used jointly by monetary authorities as an international reserve instrument. 
Another major result of this study—which concerns a period prior to the creation of the 
euro—is that developing countries that deregulated their capital account have been more inclined to 
change the composition of their international reserves in foreign currency to give more weight to 
the dollar and the pound sterling. The explanation suggested by the authors is that these two 
currencies are issued by countries that are noted for possessing the most developed international 
financial markets. It can therefore be inferred that, as the financial markets of the euro zone 
develop, the eurocurrency could occupy a more relevant position in official international reserves. 
3. Financial use of the euro by private agents: a significant 
incentive to internationalization 
The use of the euro by the private sector as a borrowing and lending currency should play a 
major role in the eurocurrency's internationalization, for three reasons: (1) Financial transactions 
have a much greater weight in international transactions than operations in goods and services. 
Thus, in foreign-exchange markets the essential part of transactions is the counterpart of financial 
transactions. (2) There is ample consensus that the creation of the eurocurrency should contribute 
to a rapid development of financial markets in euros. All the specialists foresee the progressive 
implementation of a broad, deep and liquid euro market, which is expected to result in more 
favorable lending and financing conditions for European and third-country operators. (3) The 
creation of a single European currency may favor the consolidation of the euro-zone banking 
system in its traditional role as an international financing intermediary, in particular with regard to 
emerging countries. 
3.1. The international banking market 
The banking systems of the main countries of the euro zone (Germany, France, Italy, Spain) 
have traditionally been very active in the international banking market, where they have a dominant 
position (table 5). Indeed, the presence of large banks euro-zone is particularly strong in emerging 
European, Asian and Latin American countries. 
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The recent development of the international activity of the European banks has taken place in 
several stages. At first the European banks extended loans and borrowed in euro-dollars, 
conducting maturity-transformation operations in foreign currencies to benefit non-residents. Then, 
as a result of the deregulation of exchange operations at the end of the 1980s, the European banks 
began to issue loans in their own currencies, thus increasing international liquidity in 
eurocurrency's (euro-marks, euro-francs…). With the creation of the single currency it possible 
that, by opening up a much larger market, the euro will offer European banks the opportunity to 
take advantage of their know-how. On this basis, the European banks could consolidate their 
position vis-à-vis the U.S. and Japanese markets. The international network of the euro-zone banks 
will be one of the vectors for the circulation and use of the single European currency on a 
worldwide scale.  
Table 5 
CONSOLIDATED INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS OF REPORTING BANKS 
BY NATIONALITY OF REPORTING BANKS, END-DECEMBER 2000 
(in millions of US dollars and in %) 
 








All countries* 6575.2 944.0 412.6 1997.8 432.3 564.9 2223.7 
Developed countries 4985.7 690.3 277.4 1337.2 369.8 392.2 1918.8 
Developing 
countries 
875.8 76.8 97.3 429.5 32.0 73.0 167.2 
Offshore centres 634.3 176.8 37.8 204.4 30.1 76.9 108.3 
Other 79.4 - - 26.7 0.4 22.9 29.4 
All countries** 100.0 14.4 6.3 30.4 6.6 8.6 33.8 
Developed countries 100.0 13.8 5.6 26.8 7.4 7.9 38.5 
Developing 
countries 
100.0 8.8 11.1 49.0 3.7 8.3 19.1 
Offshore centres 100.0 27.9 6.0 32.2 4.7 12.1 17.1 
Other 100.0 0.0 0.0 33.6 0.5 28.9 37.0 
(1) Intra-EMU excluded 
* Billions of US dollars 
** In % 
Source: Authors' calculations on the basis of BIS (2001a). 
3.2. The main factors in the development of the euro financial 
market 
The creation of the euro has had two direct and immediate positive effects on the capital 
markets in Europe: (1) it has put an end to the fragmentation of national markets; (2) it has 
eliminated the exchange-rate risk between the European currencies. 
By increasing the size of the markets and eliminating the obstacles to capital circulation, the 
single currency tends to increase the liquidity of the euro-zone markets, i.e., it increases the 
possibility of conducting major transactions without causing a significant change in the value of 
securities. 
The financial weight of the euro is considerably lower than its economic weight, which can 
be explained by European fragmentation. The opposite occurs in the case of the dollar, whose 
financial weight is much higher than its economic weight. To the extent that the economic weights 
of the U.S. and Europe (measured by size of GDP or population) converge there may also be a 
convergence of financial weights, thanks to a significant expansion of the capital markets of the 
euro zone (although this will no doubt be slowed by inertia). 
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Several factors that are not directly linked to the creation of the euro, but whose effects will 
be magnified by its appearance, are likely to contribute to a strong development of the capital 
markets of the euro zone. On the capital-supply side, an increase in domestic savings in Europe (for 
demographic reasons) and the changes in the way families allocate their wealth (for example, the 
share of financial deposits in the French population's equity has tripled in the last 20 years). On the 
capital-demand side in increase, three factors should strongly increase the financing needs of 
companies in Europe: economic growth, the expected increase in investment, and corporate 
restructuring. From this point of view, the creation of the euro will have strategic repercussions on 
all sectors of the economy and should involve supplementary corporate investment that will require 
efficient financing. 
3.3. Impact of the creation of the single currency on the different 
components of the euro zone's financial markets 
The different components of the euro zone's financial market—the money and foreign-
exchange markets, the stock market and the bond market—have been affected by the creation of the 
eurocurrency in 1999. Up to now, the private-sector bond market has been by far the most dynamic 
(ECB, 2000). 
3.3.1. The money and exchange markets of the euro zone 
The entry into force of the single European currency and the new monetary policy 
framework have given rise to greater integration and uniformity in the entire euro zone. With the 
introduction of the new eurocurrency, the money and inter-banking markets have begun to operate 
in a much more integrated manner. In the case of banks situated in the euro zone, a sharp reduction 
in the bid-ask spreads of short-term interest rates is observed. This is an indirect indicator of the 
integration process of the euro money market (figure 4). 
Figure 4 
THREE-MONTH MARKET RATE BID-ASK SPREADS 






















Sources: Standard & Poor's, DRI 
 
The need to redistribute liquidity between the eleven countries of the euro-zone, including 
the liquidity provided by the eurosystem's refinancing transactions, favored the development of 
cross-border transactions in the money market. These transactions represented approximately 50% 
of total activities of the combined components of the money market. The system of "real time" 
target payments used by the central-bank system has a key role in the distribution of liquidity in the 
euro zone, as well as in terms of arbitrage operations that contribute to stabilizing the interest rates 
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of the euro zone's money markets. Nevertheless, the degree of integration of these different 
components is still unequal. The pension market (exchange of liquidity against securities) is less 
integrated because the countries of the region have not harmonized their legal and tax treatments of 
the management of the securities that serve as a guarantee. 
On the other hand, the market for short-term derivative products market in euros has 
expanded rapidly. The interest-rate swap contract market in euros has become completely unified, 
as confirmed by the existence of a single yield curve for the entire euro zone. Moreover, liquidity 
and activity have increased significantly in forward contracts, and contracts in Euribor—the single 
reference rate—have replaced the old contracts. 
The transition to monetary union has been one of the main catalysts in the rationalization of 
the foreign-exchange market, undertaken thanks to mergers between banks and the increasing use 
of electronic intermediation systems. The number of operators has declined, as has the volume of 
transactions, mainly owing to the mechanical effect of eliminating crossover transactions between 
different European currencies. 
Thus, at the end of the 1990s, the foreign-exchange market underwent major transformations 
that, in large measure, are not simply a result of the creation of the euro (BIS, 2001b): 
1. The development of electronic intermediation systems (EBS and Reuters): in 2000, 85% to 
95% of inter-banking business was dealt with electronically, against 50% in 1998 and 20%-30% in 
1995. By automatically providing the best conditions, electronic intermediation has resulted in a 
reduction in transaction volumes and a significant narrowing of the gap between purchase and 
sales quotations. 
2. During the last few years there has been a move toward concentration in the banking sector 
that, as mentioned above, has contributed to reducing transaction volumes and the number of 
participants in the markets. Currently only about twenty banks are in a position to provide 
purchase and sales quotations for a wide spectrum of currencies. 
3. The previously mentioned mechanical effect of the disappearance of the eleven currencies 
of the countries that initially made up the euro zone has had an influence on reducing transaction 
volume in the European markets. This has given rise to an as yet unresolved debate regarding the 
volume of transactions between the euro and the dollar, the yen and the pound, as compared to the 
volume of transactions recorded in the past between the German mark and these currencies. 
According to Portes (1999), who uses data provided by the Reuters screens, the volume of 
operations in relation to the euro appears to be higher, whereas Hau et al (2000) arrive at the 
opposite conclusion by analyzing the spreads between purchase and sales prices, which appear to 
have increased. Other estimates, arrived at on the basis of surveys of participants, suggest that, 
initially, the volume of the euro's exchange transactions was close to that of the mark in the 
previous period. Thus, it is clearly still too early to establish what impact the creation of the euro 
has had on transaction volume and, therefore, on transaction costs. Another reason for prudence on 
this subject is that electronic transactions and concentration in the banking field have significantly 
affected the volume and structure of the foreign-exchange markets in the past few years. 
3.3.2. The stock market 
Unlike the money markets, the stock markets (and the public-sector securities markets) are 
not unified on a European scale (BIS, 2000). A rapid development of euro-denominated stock 
markets, however, can be expected over the next few years. This may be achieved as a result of 
several factors: 
1. A “catch—up” effect with regard to competing markets: in terms of percentages of GDP, 
the market capitalization of the euro zone is, as we saw, much lower than that of the United States. 
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The proportion of listed companies, still low in the euro zone, should increase over the next few 
years thanks to the imminent entry into the market of numerous medium-sized companies. 
2. The disappearance of the intra-European country risk in the bond segment is likely to attract 
risk-seeking investors to the stock markets. As in the case of the corporate bond market, the stock 
exchange will favor the arrival of foreign investors attracted by euro-zone products. 
3. The creation of the euro has given rise to initiatives that are expected to vitalize the stock 
markets. Among these is the creation of Nasdaq-Europe in 2000 (a European platform for new 
stock issues of companies with a strong growth potential), and of Easdaq, an international stock 
exchange based in Brussels, whose function is to gather together the quotations for medium-size 
and growth companies with a European or international focus. 
4. The creation of the euro should have a positive impact on cross-border and pan-European 
cooperation between stock markets, which will expedite the development of larger, more liquid 
and diversified markets. Several alliances have begun to be negotiated among the main European 
markets. 
Nevertheless, the failure of negotiations between the London and Frankfurt markets shows 
that the consolidation of a pan-European stock-exchange platform is still hindered by major 
obstacles (Galati and Tsatsaronis, 2001), even though this consolidation is considered unavoidable 
by observers and analysts. In the event that excessive competition between the existing exchanges 
should prevail and pan-European cooperation is slowed down, it will be difficult to reduce the 
markets' transaction costs and increase their liquidity. It is worth mentioning that the 
rapprochement between the Paris, Amsterdam and Brussels stock exchanges, which have recently 
completed the implementation of Euronext, constitutes a positive cooperation experience. The 
success of this venture is explained by the fact that these financial markets—each one specializing 
in its area of strength—will operate as a network, which entails fewer obligations and restrictions 
than a merger. 
3.3.3. The bond market 
The boom in the issuance of bonds denominated in the new eurocurrency is the most 
important change due to the introduction of the euro. More precisely, the segment of domestic and 
international private bonds has expanded spectacularly (Detken and Hartmann, 2000; ECB, 2000; 
Santillán, Bayle and Thygesen, 2000, BIS, 2000, ECB, 2001). 
Growth has been more moderate for domestic and international sovereign issues. True, the 
conversion into euros of the public debt denominated in the old European currencies generated a 
larger market than that of their Japanese counterpart (BIS, 2000). However, the rapid growth of 
Japanese government issues meant that the existing stock of Japanese government bonds was 
higher at the end of 2000 than that of the euro zone, which in turn is similar to that of the United 
States4. In any event, domestic sovereign bonds will not grow significantly in Europe in the coming 
years as long as the Maastricht treaty imposes limits on the fiscal deficits and debt indicators of the 
Monetary Union countries. With regard to emerging countries, following the financial crises that 
occurred after 1997, a slowdown of the rate of growth of sovereign issues is observed. 
The recent evolution of the euro-zone bond market can be summarized as follows: 
• The structure of the bond market in euros has changed. There was a drop in its share of 
sovereign-bond issue (due to a reduction in public deficits and debt-repurchasing programs); 
and an increase in the share of non-sovereign issues, i.e., those conducted by financial 
                                                     
4 It should be mentioned that, in terms of market value, the analysis provides a completely different view, because the Japanese 
government bonds reflect a persistent weakness of the Japanese economy and an increasing concern about the growing public 
indebtedness of that country (Galati and Tsatsaronis, 2001). 
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institutions and by corporations (particularly by the telecommunications sector to finance 
UMTS licenses) 
• The market, both domestic and international, of corporate debt securities in euros is 
extremely dynamic. The increase in euro-denominated private-sector bond issues 
denominated in euros has become one of the most commented phenomena in the euro’s first 
year of existence. Although some analysts have raised doubts regarding a further expansion 
following the one observed in 1999, the increase growth in the euro-denominated of the of 
non-sovereign bond market in euros, which was 16% during the first year of the single 
European currency (1999), was also significant in 2000 at 12% (ECB, 2001). 
• In this context, international issues in euros have developed rapidly: in 1999, the net 
amounts of international debt securities in euros were practically the same as the net issues 
in dollars (table 6). In spite of its decline in the second half of 2000, the recovery observed 
during the first quarter of 2001 confirms the momentum of international issues in euros. 
 
Table 6 
INTERNATIONAL DEBT SECURITIES: NET AMOUNTS BY ISSUING CURRENCY 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Q1 2000 Q1 2001 
In billions of USD 
USD 242.7 323.7 408.9 544.6 570.0 134.0 144.0 
Yen 80.7 33.4 -25.3 -8.2 31.1 -1.5 -12.2 
Euro (or euro zone 
currencies) 
128.3 130.6 224.6 533.9 443.3 130.8 135.1 
Other currencies 36.6 59.8 66.6 93.2 103.0 21.8 17.1 
 TOTAL  488.3 547.5 674.8 1163.50 1147.40 285.1 284.0 
% of the total 
USD 49.7 59.1 60.6 46.8 49.7 47.0 50.7 
Yen 16.5 6.1 -3.7 -0.7 2.7 -0.5 -4.3 
Euro (or euro zone 
currencies) 
26.3 23.9 33.3 45.9 38.6 45.9 47.6 
Other currencies 7.5 10.9 9.9 8.0 9.0 7.6 6.0 
 TOTAL  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: BIS (2001a). 
Certainly, if we consider issues by country or issuing zone we can see that the weight of the 
euro in international issues has increased significantly in the euro zone but not in the rest of the 
world (Artus, 2000). It is, however, indisputable that the euro has gained ground as an international 
debt currency: in the recent period, non-resident private lenders in the euro zone have issued 21% 
of their international debt in the eurocurrency, whereas between January 1990 and July 1998 only 
2% of their international debt was denominated in the currencies that merged into the euro (Galati 
and Tsatsaronis, 2001). 
Four main factors explain the vitality of the bond market in euros: 
1. The fall in financial intermediation (Canals, 1999): euro-zone companies are increasingly 
using the bonds market to get into debt, hence a reduction in financing through bank loans 
(disintermediation). The financial structures of the euro zone companies, increasingly reliant on 
direct financing, are approaching that of the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
2. The scale of corporate restructuring: these operations (mergers, acquisitions, etc.) involved 
a strong demand for private corporate funds that was satisfied in large measure by the issuance of 
bonds denominated in euros, in amounts unprecedented in the history of the European financial 
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markets. Mergers and acquisition: involving companies with head offices or target companies 
located in the euro zone have risen strongly in the last two years5. 
3. The dynamic role of investors, which becomes manifest in two ways: First, foreign investors 
(mainly U.S. and Asian) have increased their presence in the euro zone markets to take advantage 
of its development. Second, the euro-zone is experiencing an increase in the combined amount of 
savings managed by institutional investors (mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies). 
This results in a growing demand for investments in the form of securities negotiable in euros. In 
principle, investors want to diversify. Here, the prospects offered by the European markets are 
contradictory: the creation of a unified financial and monetary space eliminates the possibility of 
diversifying by country. However, the recent development of new segments of the euro-markets—
in particular high-yield, high-risk debts—contributes to opening up an array of options for 
investors. Another important factor for foreign investors is the matter of the correlation of asset 
yields in euros and dollars. If we consider what has been suggested in numerous recent studies, 
this could lead to greater synchronization of the economic cycles between the U.S. and Europe. 
Finally, the emergence of new instruments and segments contributes to vitalize the bond 
market. This is the case of the high-yield bond market (i.e., bonds issued by establishments that 
have low agency ratings), reinforced by an increase in merger-acquisition operations and by the 
demand for high-yield bonds by institutional investors. This market, which is also open to 
relatively modest-sized companies, has a considerable development potential (its weight is 
significantly lower than that of U.S. markets with similar characteristics). 
                                                     
5 In the banking sector (up 35% in 1999), total restructuring operations exceeded that of the United States in 1999 
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III. Europe-Latin America economic 
relations and the euro 
Given the importance of its relations with the European Union, 
Latin America will undoubtedly be affected by the emergence of the 
euro. Economic relations between the two regions have intensified 
over the past decade: In particular, during this period the flows of 
direct European investment toward Latin America reached levels 
comparable to those from the United States, and the commitment of 
European banks in the region increased considerably. In the case of 
Brazil, one of the Latin American countries that is noted for its strong 
trade and financial relations with Europe, some short and medium 
term effects (both favorable and unfavorable) related to the 
appearance of the euro have been observed in direct investment, trade 
and external financing (Baumann and Abreu, 2000). Moreover, the 
fact that the main Latin American economies have either concluded 
(Mexico) or are negotiating (Mercosur and Chile) ambitious 
cooperation and free-trade agreements with the European Union 
should - strengthen Euro-Latin American links (IRELA, 1999). 
To analyze the ways in which the euro will influence on Latin 
America, we examine the recent pattern of relations between the two 
regions in trade and, chiefly, financial activities. In the financial 
sphere we distinguish direct foreign investment, bank loans, and funds 
raised through bond issues. Lastly, the growing weight of the euro in 
the region total debt should lead countries to pay greater attention to 
the management of the currency mix of their external debt. 
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1. European-Latin American trade relations: too sluggish 
Latin America conducts around 15% of its foreign trade with the European Union. 
Throughout the 1990s, trade relations between the two regions developed asymmetrically: Latin 
American exports to Europe increased only slightly, whereas Latin American imports of European 
products rose by approximately 160%. 
The euro’s impact on trade relations between Europe and Latin America involves two 
aspects: (1) reduced transaction costs and increased competition within the euro zone as a result of 
the introduction of the single currency; (2) variations in the euro exchange. 
Some authors consider that, given the low degree of commercial openness in the economies 
of a large portion of Latin American countries (and, in particular, in some that have closer trade 
relations with the euro zone), the changes induced by variations in the effective real exchange rates 
due to decreased transaction costs or fluctuations in the activity level of European countries do not 
seen to have had any significant impact on the growth of Latin American economies (Levy Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger, 1999c). The weakness that has characterized the euro since its birth does not 
favor the intensification of trade relations between the two regions. Moreover, for Latin American 
countries whose currencies are linked to the dollar and have major trade relations with Europe—
i.e., 20% or more of exports and/or imports (table 7), the weakness of the euro against the dollar 
erodes their price-competitiveness. 
Table 7a 
GEOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS 
(% of total exports) 
 United 
States 
Europe Japan Other 
Argentina 7.91 14.62 2.54 74.93 
Barbados 11.50 20.21 0.35 67.94 
Bolivia 22.95 23.64 0.23 53.18 
Brazil 19.35 24.58 4.30 51.76 
Chile 16.41 24.03 14.16 45.40 
Colombia 38.82 24.23 2.45 34.50 
Costa Rica 48.37 21.26 1.16 29.21 
Dominica 13.64 86.36 0.00 0.00 
Dominican Republic 87.11 4.87 0.41 7.61 
Ecuador 36.53 20.12 3.62 39.74 
El Salvador 57.60 15.03 0.90 26.47 
Grenada 30.00 30.00 0.00 40.00 
Guatemala 52.08 11.42 1.97 34.52 
Guyana 24.10 24.96 1.20 49.74 
Haiti 87.07 10.54 0.34 2.04 
Honduras 38.55 21.72 4.37 35.36 
Jamaica 39.82 27.81 1.22 31.16 
Mexico 87.92 3.33 0.73 8.02 
Nicaragua 45.21 16.54 0.53 37.72 
Panama 42.27 27.09 0.57 30.07 
Paraguay 2.66 21.58 4.75 71.01 
Peru 33.54 21.55 3.98 40.93 
Trinidad and Tobago 37.81 15.57 0.16 46.47 
Uruguay 5.78 16.00 0.79 77.43 
Venezuela 47.28 7.63 1.25 43.84 
Note: 1998 or last known year 
Source: DOTS (IMF, 2000) 
CEPAL – SERIE Macroeconomía del desarrollo No 13 
 
33 
In any event, although the free trade agreements under negotiation may generate a new 
dynamic in the sphere of European-Latin American trade relations, the truth is that these relations 
have advanced very slowly during the past years. It is not likely, therefore, that trade will serve to 
increase the importance of the euro as an international currency in Latin America. 
Conversely, European-Latin American financial relations have intensified notably over the 
last few years. For this reason, it is widely agreed that the influence of the euro in Latin America 
will become much more significant through financial channels. 
Table 7b 
GEOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE OF IMPORTS 
(% of total imports) 
 United 
States 
Europe Japan Other 
Argentina 20.41 29.46 3.27 46.86 
Barbados 42.18 16.66 5.85 35.30 
Bolivia 25.28 17.35 12.20 45.17 
Brazil 22.98 27.05 5.11 44.86 
Chile 24.92 21.11 6.19 47.79 
Colombia 34.98 19.14 7.20 38.68 
Costa Rica 45.88 11.08 3.97 39.08 
Dominica 4.92 31.15 0.00 63.93 
Dominican Republic 60.24 8.84 3.30 27.62 
Ecuador 31.08 16.37 7.20 45.35 
El Salvador 42.08 9.46 4.68 43.79 
Grenada 28.57 4.61 4.15 62.67 
Guatemala 44.85 10.58 3.42 41.15 
Guyana 27.87 7.87 3.31 60.95 
Haiti 59.64 10.68 4.35 25.32 
Honduras 49.32 10.52 3.77 36.40 
Jamaica 51.55 10.95 6.13 31.37 
Mexico 75.14 8.96 4.81 11.09 
Nicaragua 32.11 10.19 6.39 51.30 
Panama 38.96 7.92 5.57 47.55 
Paraguay 11.86 10.63 7.64 69.86 
Peru 25.76 17.88 6.26 50.10 
Trinidad and Tobago 43.59 18.03 3.68 34.70 
Uruguay 11.14 20.07 2.35 66.43 
Venezuela 43.65 17.94 3.93 34.48 
Note: 1998 or last known year 
Source: DOTS (IMF, 2000) 
2. The boom of European FDI in Latin America 
In spite of the slump recorded in 2000, when the estimated FDI flows toward Latin America 
declined to 74 billion dollars (versus just over 93 billion dollars in 1999), direct foreign investment 
increased substantially during the 1990s. Net FDI flows, which tripled between 1994 and 1999, 
were three times greater in 2000 than the annual average for the 1990-1994 period (ECLAC, 2001). 
European investment surged in the 1990s, and by 1997 had reached a level comparable to 
that of direct investment of U.S. origin (SELA, 2000). Thus the increase in investment from the 
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European economic and monetary union, which has made a decisive contribution to increasing total 
FDI flows into Latin America accelerated in 1994-97 (table 8). Of the total from Europe, the total 
FDI flows of Spanish origin have been the largest. Spanish investment increased substantially in 
1999, through the nearly 15 billion dollar purchase of the main Argentine oil company by the 
Spanish company Repsol. To this was added the completion in 2000 of an operation of 
unprecedented size in the Latin American financial system: the acquisition of a 33% interest in 
Banespa (Banco do Estado de São Paulo, Brazil) through a cash payment of over 3.5 billion dollars 
by the Spanish Banco de Santander Central Hispano, which consolidated its position as the main 
international bank in Latin America. 
Table 8 
DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 
(billions of current dollars) 
 1990-1993 aggregate 1994-1997 aggregate Variation 
 Amount % Amount % % 
EMU 87.56 13.72 31.66 28.24 261.60 
United Kingdom 5.91 9.26 10.57 9.43 78.90 
Switzerland 5.80 9.08 0.26 0.23 -95.60 
Japan 1.77 2.78 3.74 3.33 110.77 
United States 41.60 65.17 65.88 58.76 58.36 
TOTAL 63.84 100.00 112.10 100.00 75.61 
Source: Authors' calculations based on IDB/IRELA (1998) and SELA (2000) data 
As a result of the increase in European FDI flows, seven of the ten largest transnational 
companies established in Latin America (based upon consolidated sales) are of European origin. 
Likewise, three of the five major international banks operating in the Latin America (in terms of 
consolidated assets) are European (ECLAC, 2001). 
3. Strong expansion of European bank credit toward Latin 
America 
3.1. Europe's banking internationalization strategy and Latin 
America 
During the past decade, the growing presence of European banks in Latin America was 
accompanied by a robust increase in European bank loans. The expansion began toward the end of 
the 1980s—when consolidated loans by euro-zone banks exceeded those of U.S. banks—and 
accelerated between 1994 and 19976. Thus, in March 2001, the credit balances of European banks 
were more than double than those of U.S. banks (figure 5). 
                                                     
6 As noted by Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1999c), bank credits originating from the euro zone countries rose from 34% to 46% 
between 1994 and 1997, while credit flows from U.S., Japanese and Canadian banks dropped from 39% to 32% of the total loans 
received by Latin America. 




CONSOLIDATED INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS OF REPORTING BANKS ON LATIN AMERICA / 
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES BY NATIONALITY OF REPORTING BANKS 
(millions of US dollars) 
Source: BIS (2001c) 
 
The increase of European bank loans to Latin America is part of the expansion drive by the 
banking systems of the main countries euro-zone; as previously mentioned, these institutions have 
been actively engaged in international banking operations, where they have achieved a dominant 
position (see table 5). 
This global strength becomes even more visible if we analyze the weight of European banks 
in the supply of funds to developing countries. While U.S. and British banking business with the 
developing countries declined progressively in the second half of the 1980s (negative net loan 
flows), the financial institutions of the euro-zone powerfully expanded of their activities, with a 























CONSOLIDATED INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS OF REPORTING BANKS ON DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES BY NATIONALITY OF REPORTING BANKS 
(billions of US dollars) 
Source: BIS (2001c) 
 
One of the main inducements for the European banks worldwide expansion has been a need 
to diversify (BIS, 1998). This involved seeking business in areas other than those in which 
European banks have traditionally had a dominant role, i.e. Africa, Central and Eastern Europe and 
the Middle East. This diversification strategy produced tangible results during the 1990s, when 
European institutions reached a preeminent position in Latin America and in the Asia-Pacific 
region, at the expense of the U.S. and Japanese banks, respectively. 
By early 2001, over 34% of the balances of bank loans to the Asia-Pacific region originated 
from euro-zone banks, far exceeding Japan's share in this region (table 9). European banking 
institutions, however, are not noted for a specialization in that area. Loans extended to the Asia-
Pacific region by euro-zone banks are 15 percentage points below the average of total euro-zone 
loans to all developing countries. Conversely, Japanese banks have a clear specialization in the 
Asia-Pacific region. Their loans to the region are, on average, 11% greater than those they extend 

























CONSOLIDATED INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS OF REPORTING BANKS ON 
INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BY NATIONALITY OF 
REPORTING BANKS END - MARCH 2001 
(In %) 
 Total Japan United 
States 
M.E.U. Switzerland United 
Kingdom 
Other 
Developing countries 100.00 8.56 11.40 49.47 3.67 8.37 18.53 
i)  Africa & Middle East  100.00 5.08 7.73 51.75 5.89 12.08 17.48 
ii)  Asia & Pacific 100.00 19.48 7.86 34.67 3.94 8.98 25.07 
iii) Europe 100.00 2.25 5.46 67.06 3.10 4.10 18.03 
iv) Latin America/Caribbean 100.00 3.77 20.01 51.19 2.87 9.01 13.15 
Differences with regard to the average structure of the developing countries  
i)  Africa & Middle East   -3.48 -3.67 2.28 2.22 3.71 -1.05 
ii)  Asia & Pacific  10.92 -3.54 -14.80 0.27 0.61 6.54 
iii) Europe  -6.31 -5.94 17.60 -0.57 -4.27 -0.50 
iv) Latin America/Caribbean  -4.79 8.61 1.72 -0.80 0.64 -5.38 
        
Developing countries 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.0
0 
i)  Africa & Middle East  13.72 8.14 9.30 14.35 22.02 19.79 12.94 
ii)  Asia & Pacific 31.41 71.48 21.66 22.01 33.74 33.70 42.50 
iii) Europe 21.37 5.62 10.24 28.97 18.03 10.45 20.79 
iv) Latin America/Caribbean 33.50 14.76 58.81 34.67 26.21 36.05 23.77 
Differences with regard to the geographical structure of all loans extended to developing countries  
i)  Africa & Middle East   -5.58 -4.42 0.63 8.30 6.07 -0.78 
ii)  Asia & Pacific  40.06 -9.75 -9.40 2.32 2.29 11.09 
iii) Europe  -15.75 -11.13 7.60 -3.33 -10.91 -0.58 
iv) Latin America/Caribbean  -18.74 25.30 1.17 -7.29 2.55 -9.73 
Significant positive differences are highlighted in boldface 
Source: BIS (2001c) 
In terms of the geographic composition of the loan portfolio, European banks make 22% of 
their loans to this region. This represents a share of 9.8 percentage points lower than the 
composition of the total world portfolio of BIS-reporting banks, in which 31.4% is made up of 
credits to the Asia-Pacific countries. Japanese banks, on the other hand, devote 71% of their loans 
to the Asian region. This is 40 percentage points more than the weight of the Asian-Pacific region 
in the overall portfolio of loans to the developing countries made by all reporting banks. 
Focusing more specifically on Latin America, at the beginning of 2001, 51% of the bank 
loans received were from euro-zone institutions, as opposed to 20% from U.S. banks. In terms of 
geographic specialization, however, credits extended by U.S. institutions were more concentrated 
in the Latin America. Indeed, the credit volume directed at Latin America was 8.6 percentage 
points higher than the average structure of the loans received by developing countries from U.S. 
banks. Moreover, U.S. banks devoted almost 59% of their loans to the Latin American region—i.e., 
25 percentage points more than the weight of Latin America in the overall "developing country" 
portfolio of the reporting banks. 
By virtue of the sharp rise in of European bank credits to Latin America during the 1990s, all 
the large and medium-sized countries of the region (and many of the small ones) show a bank 
borrowing structure in which euro zone institutions are predominant. In Argentina, as in Brazil, 
Mexico, Venezuela, Chile, Colombia or Peru, for example, the euro zone institutions were the 
source of at least 40% of total bank loans in December 2000 (table 10). 




CONSOLIDATED INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS OF REPORTING BANKS ON 
INDIVIDUAL LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES BY NATIONALITY  
OF REPORTING  BANKS, END-DECEMBER 2000 
(In %) 
  United States European Monetary Union Japan Other 
Cuba 0.00 79.87 3.08 17.05 
Belize 2.17 75.85 0.00 21.98 
Peru 9.71 75.50 1.12 13.67 
Paraguay 6.74 74.59 0.00 18.68 
Bolivia 18.18 71.79 0.08 9.95 
Uruguay 16.56 65.90 0.20 17.34 
Surinam 31.48 61.11 0.00 7.41 
Argentina 16.21 57.77 2.66 23.36 
Chile 16.55 57.15 5.24 21.06 
Nicaragua 29.05 52.70 4.98 13.28 
Haiti 27.96 50.54 0.00 21.51 
Venezuela 21.18 50.31 4.04 24.47 
        
Mexico 23.85 48.01 4.00 24.13 
Colombia 20.59 47.17 9.69 22.56 
Guyana 13.24 47.06 0.00 39.71 
Trinidad and Tobago 11.86 47.03 2.74 38.37 
Brazil 21.23 44.90 4.21 29.66 
Dominica 0.00 43.06 0.00 56.94 
Dominican Republic 27.59 39.27 0.00 33.14 
Honduras 34.65 37.91 0.00 27.44 
Ecuador 33.37 36.31 4.12 26.20 
El Salvador 38.39 30.04 0.00 31.58 
St Lucia 0.00 29.55 0.00 70.45 
Costa Rica 30.37 28.98 1.53 39.12 
St Vincent 0.00 26.71 0.00 73.29 
Guatemala 51.18 25.79 0.00 23.03 
Grenada 0.00 18.42 0.00 81.58 
Jamaica 24.70 18.03 0.85 56.41 
Residual 40.01 1.22 0.00 58.77 
TOTAL 19.88 51.50 3.65 24.97 
Source: BIS (2001a). 
 
3.2. Banking flows and foreign direct investment from Europe 
As part of the geographic diversification implemented in the 1990s, the expansion of 
European banking loans to the Latin American region was accompanied by an increase in European 
foreign direct investment. More precisely, the robust growth in European-originated bank credits to 
Latin America coincided with the previously mentioned acceleration of European investments in 
the region between 1993 and 1997 (table 11). In an August 1998 report, the BIS noted that the 
strong penetration of European banks in the Asian and, more importantly, Latin American markets 
is explained both by favorable prospects in terms of overall growth and financial yield and by the 
fact that the European banking institutions (excluding British banks) have followed the lead of the 
large European industrial and trading corporations (i.e., their main clients in Europe) in 
establishing themselves in Latin America and, to a lesser degree, Asia. 
This interpretation appears to be confirmed by the strong correlation found between the 
growth in FDI from Europe in Latin America and the notable increase of European bank loans to 
the Latin America. This relationship is significantly stronger than the correlation observed between 
the growth of U.S. foreign investment and of banking flows of U.S. origin (figure 7). 




CONTRIBUTION BY REGION TO THE INCREASE IN FDI AND NET  
BANKING FLOWS IN LATIN AMERICA(1) 1993-1997 
(in billions of dollars and in % of total increase) 
  Contribution to FDI   Contribution to bank credits 
 Amounts %   Amounts % 
European Monetary Union 10.89 77.88  62.42 75.71 
United States 0.92 6.58  9.28 11.25 
Switzerland -1.42 -10.19  8.99 10.91 
United Kingdom 2.40 17.17  5.81 7.05 
Japan 1.20 8.57   -4.04 -4.90 
(1) Change in flows, disregarding existing stocks. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on IDB/IRELA and BIS (2001a) data. 
 
Figure 7 
FDI AND BANK LOAN FLOWS IN LATIN AMERICA:  
A CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
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Source: Authors' calculations based on BIS (2001a), SELA (2000) 
 
There is, therefore, a clear divergence between the United States and the euro-zone countries in 
terms of the recent expansion of their financial and trade activities in Latin America. One of the reasons 
is the existence of institutional differences between the U.S. and European financial systems. In the U.S. 
there is a predominance of direct financing of loss-making agents through the capital market, which has a 
decisive weight and influence at an international level, whereas in continental Europe—in spite of a 
recent expansion in direct financing—indirect financing through banking systems still prevails. This 
helps explain the substantial international development of the European banking systems that, as can be 
seen in Latin America, goes hand in hand with the internationalization of European firms. 
The strong international expansion of the European banks may well contribute to the development 
of the euro as an international currency. 
The increase of loans to emerging countries, and in particular to Latin America, during the 1990s 
represents a new stage of the internationalization process that began in the 1970s. European banks have 
been playing a major role in the financing of emerging and developing countries for three decades. 
At first, most European bank loans were in dollars, fulfilling a transformation function to the 
benefit of non-resident agents: long-term loans of euro-dollars borrowed on a short-term basis. 
During the 1990s, credit activities in Latin America continued to be mostly in dollars. With the 
creation of the single currency, however, it is possible that European banks might extend loans 
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largely in euros, which would involve a process of currency creation (and not only transformation) 
that would help feed the international markets in "euro" liquidity7. The bank-financing channel of 
the world economy might thus favor a greater international use of the euro. 
Two highly likely implications can be identified with regard to European bank financing of 
Latin America associated with FDI of European origin: (1) European bank financing is a generator of 
external debt for the countries of the region, which creates a dual force linking Europe and Latin 
America through both productive investment and financial activities. (2) A greater use of the euro as 
the currency between parent companies and subsidiaries, and a larger proportion of credits in that 
currency, could reduce or eliminate the exchange-rate risk for the companies and banks involved. 
4. Growing share of euro-denominated bond issues 
The strong expansion of credits from European commercial banks to Latin America is not the only 
relevant aspect of the recent dynamics of European-Latin American financial relations. These have also 
been characterized by an increase in international bond issues—crucial source of debt-generating external 
financing of Latin America in the past few years—, in which euro-denominated loans have surged. 
This expansion is common to the group of developing countries that have participated significantly in 
the growth of the euro-denominated bond market over the past few years. As shown in figure 7, the 
eurocurrency share of the total issues of those countries grew uninterruptedly since 1994, continued to 
increase in 1999, and then declined slightly in 2000. In spite of this decline, however, which resulted from a 
reduction in the issue of sovereign bonds in euros (which represented one-third of the total in 2000), private-
sector bond issues have continued to expand. The share of the latter doubled in 2000, from 6% to 12% of 
the total, at the expense of issues in dollars (figure 8). With regard to sovereign issues, the drop recorded in 
2000 mainly favored issues in yen, because the share of issues in dollars also declined. The percentage of 
U.S. issues in the total issues of developing countries has reached its lowest point since 1993, if we exclude 
the year 1995 (figures 9 and 10). 
Figure 8 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE EURO SHARE OF BOND ISSUES OF  
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(% of total issues by type of debtor) 
Error! Not a valid link. 
Source: Bondware. 
                                                     
7 In this event it can be expected that countries borrowing in a specific currency will also hold deposits denominated in that same 
currency (Plihon, 1994). 


































































































 Source: CDC-IXIS based on Bondware. 
 
Figure 10 
SOVEREIGN BOND ISSUES BY CURRENCY 
Error! Not a valid link. 
Source: CDC-IXIS based on Bondware. 
 
Latin America has experienced an increase in the share of euro-denominated bonds in total 
issues since 1994 (figure 11). Figure 11 also shows that the share of bonds issued in euros by the 
public sector, which had been experiencing strong growth since 1994 (in spite of the decline 
recorded in 1997), dropped slightly in 2000. Conversely, the share of bonds issued in euros in the 
total international issues of the Latin American private sector has continued to rise. In sum, as of 
1999 there has been a widening of the gap between the Latin American share of euro-denominated 
bond issues the total issued by those countries (figure 12). With a share that in 2000 reached 60% 
of developing countries, Latin America has become an active participant in the internationalization 





DEVELOPMENT OF THE EURO SHARE IN LATIN AMERICAN BOND ISSUES 
(% of total issues by type of debtor) 




























Source: CDC-IXIS based on Bondware. 
 
Figure 12 
DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICAN SHARE IN BOND ISSUES 




















Source: CDC-IXIS based on Bondware. 
 
The continuation of this process—increased borrowing by emerging countries and, in 
particular, by Latin American countries—has implications on two different but interconnected 
levels: (1) liquidity in the emerging component of the euro-denominated bond market and (2) the 
management of the currency composition of the external debt. 
The growth of emerging issues in euros has generated a single market that replaces the 
segmented markets in the previous currencies (German mark, French franc, Italian lira…). This will 
surely favor the consolidation of a more liquid and deeper market. However, the process is still in 
its initial stages. The liquidity of the euro-denominated emerging-bond market is still limited for 
two reasons: (1) In the euro zone, a major proportion of investors in this type of securities consist 
of fund-administering institutions, which does not favor the development of a secondary market for 
the paper. (2) More importantly, the average size of emerging issues in euros is relatively small 
compared with those issued in dollars. Although 50% of the issues of emerging sovereign bonds 
carried out in 2000 and 2001 were denominated in euros, the average amount of those issues is 
significantly lower than that of dollars issues (table 12). In Latin America, in turn, the average 
amounts are systematically higher than those of all developing countries. As observed in table 12, 
CEPAL – SERIE Macroeconomía del desarrollo No 13 
 
43 
however, up to now there have never been any "jumbo" issues in euros (exceeding one billion 
dollars). Thus, the benchmark of these markets consists of securities denominated in U.S. dollars8. 
 
Table 12 
NUMBER AND AMOUNTS OF EMERGING SOVEREIGN BOND  
ISSUES IN 2000 AND 2001(1) 
(in billions of dollars and in %) 










TOTAL 82 40.95 0.50 1.50 0.04 100.00 100.00 
Dollar 29 20.08 0.69 1.50 0.10 35.37 49.02 
Euro 41 15.73 0.38 0.99 0.04 50.00 38.41 
Yen 12 5.15 0.43 0.57 0.14 14.63 12.57 
Latin America 42 23.35 0.56 1.50 0.09 100.00 100.00 
Dollar 15 11.48 0.77 1.50 0.10 35.71 49.14 
Euro 22 9.17 0.42 0.99 0.09 52.38 39.29 
Yen 5 2.70 0.54 0.57 0.47 11.90 11.57 
  2001 
TOTAL 54 20.12 0.37 1.50 0.05 100.00 100.00 
Dollar 21 9.90 0.47 1.50 0.05 38.89 49.20 
Euro 27 8.40 0.31 0.94 0.05 50.00 41.73 
Yen 6 1.83 0.30 0.65 0.17 11.11 9.07 
Latin America 33 12.90 0.39 1.50 0.05 100.00 100.00 
Dollar 14 6.95 0.50 1.50 0.10 42.42 53.88 
Euro 16 4.80 0.30 0.94 0.05 48.48 37.19 
Yen 3 1.15 0.38 0.65 0.24 9.09 8.93 
Note: Issues up to 09/07/2001. Excludes swap. 
Source: CDC IXIS, Department of Economic and Financial Analysis, Country-Risk and 
Emerging-Markets Unit. 
 
The growing weight of foreign bonds denominated in euros leads us to give more careful 
consideration to the impact on the debt service of interest rate performance in the euro zone, as 
well as the management policy for currency borrowing. This latter subject, which involves the 
optimal currency composition of the external debt, is addressed below. 
5. External-debt management: currency composition 
The dollar is the main external-debt issuing currency of all countries in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (table 13). However, if the euro continues to develop as an international borrowing 
currency, its weight in the structure of external bonds will tend to increase. This makes it necessary 
to pay closer attention to the management of the currency composition of the external debt. 
In principle, the management of the currency composition of the debt consists in considering 
simultaneously the trade balance and the financial costs resulting from external borrowing in order 
to minimize losses arising from exchange-rate fluctuations between the international currencies. 
Obviously, the problem would not arise if only one currency existed for transaction and 
international financing. 
                                                     
8 Some market operators consider that a swap involving securities euro-denominated, similar to the mega-swap (in dollars) carried out 
by Argentina at the beginning of June 2001, could create a benchmark in the eurocurrency and accelerate the development of 
liquidity in the emerging euro-denominated bond markets. 




STRUCTURE OF THE LATIN AMERICAN DEBT, BY CURRENCY 
(1999, % of the total debt) 
  Dollar Euro Yen Other 
Argentina 64.10  11.30  5.70  18.90  
Barbados 46.80  0.00  0.00  53.20  
Bolivia 46.90  9.50  4.40  39.20  
Brazil 70.80  4.30  5.30  19.60  
Chile 83.20  1.70  6.50  8.60  
Colombia 77.60  2.60  4.80  15.00  
Costa Rica 72.30  0.70  5.60  21.40  
Dominica 71.80  8.20  0.80  19.20  
Dominican Republic 72.60  2.40  6.60  18.40  
Ecuador 83.00  2.00  6.10  8.90  
El Salvador 68.30  4.70  5.60  21.40  
Grenada 65.10  1.30  0.00  33.60  
Guatemala 75.30  4.40  2.60  17.70  
Guyana 66.50  1.00  0.00  32.50  
Haiti 80.60  2.30  0.00  17.10  
Honduras 62.90  4.20  9.40  23.50  
Jamaica 57.70  2.50  8.40  31.40  
Mexico 77.30  5.40  8.50  8.80  
Nicaragua 70.60  7.60  2.40  19.40  
Panama 90.40  0.10  2.20  7.30  
Paraguay 46.60  5.10  20.80  27.50  
Peru 72.60  4.10  11.70  11.60  
Trinidad and Tobago 61.00  0.80  4.90  33.30  
Uruguay 76.80  4.10  4.60  14.50  
Venezuela 80.40  7.90  3.00  8.70  
Source: World Bank (WDF, 2001). 
 
Neither would there be any problem in managing the currency composition of the debt if the 
entire external debt of a country could be permanently keyed to the changes in international 
exchange rate, thus making it possible to achieve a debt profile that would guarantee minimum 
losses due to exchange rate instability. The financial cost of this type of strategy is, however, 
theoretically higher (liquidity risks and resulting transaction costs of a permanent swap) than the 
benefit that could be derived from short-term external-debt management-even more so if the 
amounts involved represent a sizeable proportion of the gross domestic product of a country, as 
occurs in a most cases. 
A first approach to the problem of the optimal currency composition of the external debt 
(selection of a portfolio made up of debt in dollars and euros, for example) is to determine a 
borrowing structure that would minimize fluctuations in income from foreign trade, net of 
interest—as do Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1999c) by estimating of a model proposed by 
Claessens (1992). 
In this approach, which assumes a framework of invariable exchange-rate arrangements, the 
optimization strategy necessarily involves the existence of a stable relationship between trade 
balance and financial costs. The existence of wide international fluctuations of the nominal and real 
variables during the 1990s, however, has not provided a stable context in which to implement an 
optimum debt management. Thus, the calculations made by Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger for the 
1992-1998 period (using a portfolio made up of debt in dollars, marks and yen) do not show a 
stable structure of relations between trade and indebtedness that would have made it possible to 
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minimize the losses resulting from fluctuations in the international currencies. In fact, what is 
apparent is that debt diversification is due to specific debt issuance conditions in the different 
markets (different transaction costs, depth and liquidity, spreads, etc.) rather than to a defined 
strategy to optimize the currency composition. 
There is another way to address the problem of the currency composition of the debt and its 
relationship with the geographical structure of foreign trade. According to Bénassy-Quéré and 
Lahrèche-Revil (1999), the question that should be asked is: what would be the optimum anchor 
basket that would make it possible to minimize the losses arising from fluctuations between 
international currencies, given a geographic structure of foreign trade and a borrowing structure 
inherited from past decisions? 
The analysis by these authors is an extension of an approach to the fundamental equilibrium 
exchange rate proposed by Williamson (1994). This approach suggests that the monetary 
authorities should seek a real exchange-rate level that would ensure a current-account balance 
consistent with external financing and full-employment needs. Once the exchange-rate reaches its 
level of fundamental equilibrium, the exchange policy should focus on achieving a stable effective 
exchange rate. As a result, the national currency should be anchored in real terms to a basket of 
currencies weighted by the trade structure. 
If, however, the external debt of a country is denominated in currencies that are different 
from those used in trade transactions, the financing needs do not depend exclusively on their 
external competitiveness. Thus, according to Bénassy-Quéré and Lahrèche-Revil (1999), the 
authorities should define a real exchange-rate target that would meet two objectives: trade 
competitiveness and minimization of costs linked to fluctuations in the external debt service. 
If we consider that the most likely scenario is a progression toward highly volatile, bipolar 
and asymmetrical international monetary arrangements (dollar and euro as financing currencies, 
dollar as the transaction and invoicing currency) and that external borrowing in euros will tend to 
increase in developing countries for reasons of diversification, the dollar/euro fluctuations will 
have a strong nominal and real impact on the economies of these countries. 
This type of approach, which presupposes a theoretical and regulatory discussion regarding 
the management of exchange-rate arrangements, goes beyond simply optimizing the currency 
composition of the external debt. This discussion is relevant to Latin American countries, in 
particular to those that have greater geographical and monetary diversification in their trade and 
borrowing structures9. 
                                                     
9 This seems to be the objective of Argentina, when she decided in 2001 to include the euro as an anchor currency in its currency 
board whenever the euro reaches a unit exchange-rate against the dollar. 
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IV. Emergence of the euro and the 
unit-of-account function: 
implications for Latin America 
The studies on the creation of the euro and its prospect as an 
international currency have larglye focused on its functions as a 
medium of payment, financing and borrowing. Recently, the 
management of international reserves and the potential role of the euro 
as a reserve currency have also begun to be studied (Alogoskoufis and 
Portes, 1997; most importantly, Eichengreen and Mathieson, 2000). 
Conversely, the unit-of-account function is often neglected, probably 
because currency price-setting in international trade is particularly 
subject to inertia resulting from the existence of grid externalities. 
Another factor that is usually put forward to explain this is that 
invoicing currencies appear to derive their use from their other 
functions explanation usually offered (Bénassy-Quéré and Cœuré, 
2000). 
As previously mentioned, the unit-of-account function not only 
has to do with price-setting in international trade; it also concerns the 
use of international currencies as reference (anchor) currencies, which 
is one of the crucial functions in the internationalization process.  In 
the short term, it will be very difficult for the euro to compete with the 
dollar as a worldwide anchor currency, given that decisions in this 
sphere are linked to the type of integration—in both trade (geographic 
pattern of trade flows) and financing (borrowing currencies, 
FDIsources, etc.) —as well as to trade practices (as previously 
mentioned, most commodities trade is conducted in dollars). 
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In particular, the existence of strong inertia in trade and financial practices hinders a more 
rapid development of the euro as an international currency. In any event, the use of the euro as an 
anchor currency of third countries can be expected to increase in the medium and long term. 
In this chapter, we will: (1) address the issue of the de facto determination of currency anchors, as 
against the officially-stated anchors, i.e., those published by the IMF (in its Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions); (2) study the real and financial determinants of the options 
adopted by developing countries in terms of de facto anchoring on the basis of an econometric analysis 
conducted for 93 economies; (3) build a typology of the analyzed countries; and (4) explore ways in 
which the euro could be adopted as an anchor currency a cross Latin America. 
1. De facto anchoring arrangements: methodology 
Following the approach proposed by Bénassy—Quéré and Cœuré (2000), an estimate is 
made of de facto exchange arrangements through the use of econometric equations based on the 
generalized moments method (see Annex 1). The implicit anchors of 111 currencies have been 
estimated on the basis of weekly data both before and after the financial crises of the emerging 
countries (1997-98). 
The results show that the proportion of currencies with de facto anchoring to the dollar is 
much higher (50%) than could be surmised from the official data published by the IMF (see tables 
14 and 15). This phenomenon has continued after the Asian crisis, suggesting that, at least in the 
short term, the current system has not changed as substantially as is usually suggested (i.e., decline 
in peg to a reference currencies and generalization of pure floats). Therefore, pure floats are much 
less frequent de facto (4%) than de jure (30%). 
These results converge in part with those obtained by Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1999b), 
who observed numerous de facto anchors. In addition, there does not appear to have been a decline 
in the so-called intermediate arrangements (one of whose characteristics of which is an anchor to a 
basket of currencies). This has been demonstrated by Masson (2000) using a dynamic analysis of 
the transitions between exchange arrangements. 
Table 14 
OFFICIAL EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AND THEIR EVOLUTION 
(% of all IMF member country currencies, in December of each year) 
Exchange arrangements 1983 1988 1994 1999 
Number of currencies 146 152 181 187 
Fixed anchor to one currency (including 
currency boards) 35.6 38.3 26.0 30.0 
Dollar 23.3 25.7 13.8 15.0 
Franc, mark, euro 8.9 9.2 8.3 12.3 
Other 3.4 3.4 3.9 2.7 
Fixed anchor to a basket of currencies 27.4 25.7 13.3 9.6 
SDR 8.9 5.3 1.7 3.2 
Ecu 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.0 
Other 17.8 19.7 11.0 6.4 
Limited flexibility 11.0 7.2 7.2 5.9 
European exchange mechanism 4.8 4.6 5.0 1.1 
Other 6.2 2.6 2.2 4.8 
Limited float 19.9 17.8 19.9 23.0 
Free float 6.1 11.2 33.7 31.6 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 
several numbers. 




DE FACTO EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS 
(% of all currencies analyzed) 
  April 1995-June 1997 (prior to the Asian crisis) 
October 1998-December 
1999 (after the Asian crisis) 
Number of currencies 107.0 107.0 
Unit anchor to one 
currency 61.8 59.8 
Dollar 50.6 49.5 
Euro 10.3 10.3 
Yen 0.9 0.0 
Partial anchor to one 
currency 13.0 9.3 
Dollar 12.1 6.5 
Euro 0.9 1.9 
Yen 0.0 0.9 
Anchor to a basket of 
currencies 20.5 27.1 
Dollar/euro 12.1 14.0 
Dollar/yen 5.6 2.8 
Euro/yen 1.9 2.8 
Euro/dollar/yen 0.9 7.5 
Free float 4.7 3.7 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
Note: the 14 African countries of the franc zone are treated as a single country. 
Source: Bénassy-Quéré and Coeuré (2000). 
 
In sum, according to the approach adopted in this study, the international monetary system 
does not seem to be evolving toward a general use of floats. Moreover, Bénassy—Quéré and 
Cœuré (2000) note that the IMS is still a long way from a configuration of different currency 
blocks of comparable size. 
2. Financial and trade determinants of de facto anchors  
On the basis of the results presented in the previous section, we will now focus on the real 
and financial determinants of the of de facto anchoring arrangements adopted by the 93 countries 
considered. Table 16 shows the correlation between the anchoring coefficients and the trade, 
financial and geographic variables10. 
This table shows, mainly, that the anchoring coefficients are correlated with the trade and 
financial variables. The use of the euro as a de facto anchor currency correlates significantly with 
the use of the euro as a borrowing currency (0.197) and with the geographic pattern of trade 
(0.458), i.e. those cases in which Europe is predominant as a client and supplier of the countries 
considered. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the countries of Europe (Central, East and 
South), as well as the African countries of the franc zone, have a strong correlation with the use of 
the euro as a de facto anchor currency (either as the sole currency or as the dominant currency in 
anchor baskets). 
                                                     
10 The anchoring coefficients are taken from Bénassy–Quéré and Cœuré (2000). The following binary variables were associated with 
those variables: Dolbin= 1 if the coefficient is equal to or higher than 0.5, 0 if it is lower; Eurobin= 1 if the coefficient is equal to or 
higher than 0.3, 0 if it is lower; Yenbin= 1 if the coefficient is equal to or higher than 0.1, 0 if it is lower. The "oil-exporting" binary 
variable is assigned to countries whose oil sales represent over 10% of their total exports. The "dollarised" binary variable is 
attributed to countries where the dollar share in M3 is high, following IMF typology. Geographical distances are measured in 
kilometres (km) between ports or capitals. 




TRADE, DEBT AND DE-FACTO ANCHORING ARRANGEMENTS 
Correlation table 
  Dollar Euro Yen Dolbin Eurobin Yenbin 
Dollar 1.000  -0.969  -0.612  0.911  -0.937  -0.589  
Euro -0.969  1.000  0.396  -0.859  0.884  0.393  
Yen -0.612  0.396  1.000  -0.634  0.649  0.927  
Dolbin 0.911  -0.859  -0.634  1.000  -0.865  -0.602  
Eurobin -0.937  0.884  0.649  -0.865  1.000  0.652  
Yenbin -0.589  0.393  0.927  -0.602  0.652  1.000  
Debt structure by currency 
In Dollars 0.019  -0.044  0.069  -0.032  -0.021  0.096  
In Euros -0.272  0.197  0.378  -0.356  0.292  0.350  
In Yens 0.205  -0.144  -0.292  0.213  -0.142  -0.251  
Degree of dollarisation of the economies 
Dollarised 0.089  -0.016  -0.276  0.166  -0.154  -0.206  
Oil exports 
Oil-exporting 0.140  -0.129  -0.104  0.144  -0.202  -0.155  
Foreign trade structure 
With United States 0.355  -0.352  -0.195  0.370  -0.371  -0.198  
With Japan 0.251  -0.240  -0.164  0.226  -0.222  -0.178  
With Europe -0.451  0.458  0.211  -0.465  0.439  0.159  
              
Geography and anchoring arrangements 
Correlations table 
 Dollar Euro Yen Dolbin Eurobin Yenbin 
Geographic distances 
kmUS 0.017  -0.019  -0.005  -0.032  0.020  -0.043  
kmJapan -0.089  0.017  0.274  -0.143  0.092  0.241  
kmEurope 0.446  -0.468  -0.162  0.454  -0.415  -0.174  
Geographic areas 
Latin America 0.341  -0.331  -0.208  0.398  -0.360  -0.179  
Central 0.202  -0.199  -0.112  0.276  -0.195  -0.032  
South 0.245  -0.234  -0.162  0.240  -0.278  -0.210  
Asia 0.312  -0.284  -0.252  0.299  -0.287  -0.261  
Middle East 0.153  -0.132  -0.146  0.139  -0.161  -0.122  
Europe -0.358  0.456  -0.127  -0.209  0.273  -0.087  
Africa -0.364  0.253  0.539  -0.506  0.424  0.481  
Africa-CFA -0.532  0.365  0.805  -0.668  0.578  0.765  
Africa-NCFA 0.047  -0.029  -0.085  0.001  -0.017  -0.118  
Note: Figures in boldface indicate statistically significant correlations. CFA: CFA franc zone 
CNFA: other African countries. 
Sources: Trade: DOTS-IMF (2000), Debt: World Bank (WDI 2000), Dollarisation: IMF 174 
(1998), Exchange arrangements: Bénassy-Quéré (2000). 
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To complete the analysis, we conducted an econometric probability study (table 17). 
Table 17 
PROBABILITY OF USING AN INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY 
  Dollar Euro Yen 
 Coef. Z-Stat Proba. Coef. Z-Stat Proba. Coef. Z-Stat Proba. 
Constant 1.40 1.22 0.222  -0.32 -0.36 0.716 -0.66 -0.57 0.568 
Direction of trade 
With Japan 0.27 2.30 0.022  -0.19 -2.64 0.008 -0.03 -0.35 0.724 
With Europe -0.04 -3.04 0.002  0.03 2.20 0.028 -0.03 -2.11 0.035 
With USA 0.04 2.12 0.034  -0.04 -2.52 0.012 -0.09 -3.59 0.000 
Debt composition by currency 
In dollars 0.00 0.034 0.973  -0.01 -0.44 0.660 0.06 2.42 0.015 
In euros -0.10 -3.441 0.001  0.06 2.70 0.007 0.16 3.57 0.000 
In yen 0.12 3.501 0.001  -0.06 -2.33 0.020 -0.90 -3.75 0.000 
Other determinants 
Oil-exporting 1.82 2.79 0.005  -1.26 -2.15 0.032 -1.78 -2.07 0.039 
Dollarised 0.21 0.43 0.666  -0.19 -0.46 0.645 -1.70 -2.43 0.015 
Restr. log likelihood   -19.55    -25.44    -13.66   
Probability(LR stat)   0.00    0.00    0.00   
Obs with Dep=0   27.00    58.00    68.00   
Obs with Dep=1   63.00    31.00    18.00   
Included observations   90.00    89.00    86.00   
McFadden R-squared   0.64    0.56    0.69   
% Correct   92.1%     83.9%     72.2%   
Notes: Figures in boldface indicate variables with a significance level at least 90%. Owing to problems 
multicollinearity between the trade variables and those that represent geographic distances, the latter 
have not been included in the econometric estimate. 
 
The econometric estimates suggest that the likelihood of using the dollar as an anchor currency 
increases when the United States is a major trading partner of the country in question. Symmetrically, the 
likelihood declines when the main partner is Europe. 
As regards to the predominance of a currency for borrowing purposes, when a country is indebted 
mainly in dollars, the likelihood of using the U.S. currency as an anchor is not significant. This is 
explained by that fact that all the countries of the sample are mainly indebted in dollars. In addition, the 
likelihood of anchoring a currency to the dollar declines significantly when a major part of the external 
debt of the country considered is denominated in euros. On the other hand, oil-exporting countries have a 
strong likelihood of anchoring their currencies to the dollar because the international oil trade is 
conducted in dollar. 
For the yen, the results of the econometric equations concerning with the likelihood of anchoring a 
currency to the Japanese currency are poor. Thus, being a major trading partner of Japan does not 
increase the likelihood of using the yen as an anchor currency. Moreover, the likelihood of using the yen 
as an anchor decreases significantly when the foreign debt of a country is denominated in that currency. 
Lastly, as would be expected, in the oil-exporting countries and those that are noted for a high degree of 
dollarisation in their economies, the likelihood of anchoring their currencies to the yen is slight. Several 
factors serve to explain these econometric results: One is the crisis that has affected Japan since 1990. 
Another is the strong nominal and real short-term fluctuations experienced by the yen in the past years. 
Uncertainty regarding the Japanese economy and the volatility of the yen increases transaction costs and 
exchange-rate risks. Yet another factor is the absence of political will—no to say the hostility—by the 
Japanese authorities with regard to developing the yen as an international currency. 
For the euro, the likelihood that a country will use it as an anchor currency decreases when the 
trade of a country is conducted mainly with Japan or the United States, and increases if it is conducted 
with the euro-zone countries, again assuming these countries are major trading partners. Likewise, the 
results of the exercise confirm that the likelihood of using the euro as an anchor increases when a major 
part of the external debt of the country considered is denominated in euros. On the other hand, and 
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inverting the equation that analyses the use of the dollar as an anchor, the likelihood of anchoring a 
national currency to the euro declines significantly for oil-exporting countries. 
3. A typology of countries 
The factors considered up to now can be analyzed more deeply in order to identify the positioning 
of the countries of the sample. To achieve this, a factor analysis of the main components is conducted 
(see Annex 2), making it possible to group the countries with homogenous trade, financial and 
geographical features. We begin by shoving how we organized the information (table 18). 
Table 18 
INHERENT VALUES AND CORRELATION BETWEEN MAIN VARIABLES 
AND FACTORS FOR THE FIRST FOUR AXES (SIGNIFICANT) 
Inherent values   1 2 3 4 
Value 2.40   2.05   1.19   1.02   
% variability 26.63   22.75   13.23   11.35   
% aggregate 26.63   49.37   62.60   73.95   
  factor 1 factor 2 factor 3 factor 4 
Trade with USA 0.75   -0.09   0.00   0.45   
Trade with Japan 0.01   0.70   -0.03   -0.35   
Trade with Europe -0.72   -0.26   -0.03   -0.28   
Debt in dollars 0.61   -0.36   -0.22   -0.39   
Debt in yen 0.06   0.66   -0.13   0.38   
Debt in euros -0.60   -0.26   0.30   0.52   
Distance from USA -0.40   0.65   0.42   -0.15   
Distance from Japan 0.12   -0.55   0.71   -0.14   
Distance from Europe 0.64   0.36   0.59   -0.08   
 
The four main axes represent 74% of the aggregate variability. In other words, approximately 
three-quarters of the total information contained in the variables can be summarized in these four main 
axes. Figure 13 makes it possible to identify the opposition between the variables that are more strongly 
linked to the dollar with regard to those that are more related to the euro. 
Figure 13 
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Figure 14 presents the projection of the countries in the factor space defined by the two main 
axes, which summarize approximately 50% of the total information contained in the variables used. 
Predictably, a great majority of the Latin American countries are situated the south-eastern region of the 
factor space dominated by trade with the United States and indebtedness mainly denominated in dollars. 




PROJECTION OF COUNTRIES IN THE FACTOR SPACE DEFINED BY AXES 1 AND 2 
(50%) 
 
From the country coordinates in the factor space defined by the main four axes, we can identify 
five different groups (table 19). 
Table 19 
TYPOLOGY OF COUNTRIES ON THE BASIS OF PCFA RESULTS 
Classification of observations / Number of countries  
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 
15 26 16 22 14 
Bulgaria Benin Bangladesh Argentina Cameroon 
Croatia Burkina Faso Cambodia Barbados Congo, Rep. 
Czech Rep. Burundi China Bolivia Cote d'Ivoire 
Dominica Central African Rep. India Brazil Egypt, Arab Rep. 
Equatorial Guinea Chad Indonesia Chile Estonia 
Grenada Comoros Jordan Colombia Gabon 
Kazakhstan Djibouti Korea, Rep. Costa Rica Hungary 
Latvia Ethiopia Lao PDR Dominican Rep. Mali 
Lebanon Gambia, The Malaysia Ecuador Morocco 
Lithuania Ghana Mongolia El Salvador Niger 
Poland Guinea-Bissau Nepal Guatemala Nigeria 
Romania Iran, Islamic Rep. Pakistan Guyana Russian Federation 
Slovak Republic Kenya Philippines Haiti Tunisia 
Syrian Arab Rep. Madagascar Sri Lanka Honduras Turkey 
Ukraine Malawi Thailand Jamaica  
 Mauritania Vietnam Mexico  
 Mauritius  Nicaragua  
 Mozambique  Panama  
 Paraguay  Peru  
 Senegal  Trinidad and Tobago  
 Seychelles  Uruguay  
 Sierra Leone  Venezuela  
 Tanzania     
 Togo     
 Zambia     
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A second econometric exercise, taking into account the coordinates of the countries on the factor 
plane (which summarize the information provided by the variables used to calculate the factor axes) 
confirms that the fact of exporting oil increases the likelihood of anchoring the national currency to the 
dollar and significantly decreases the likelihood of anchoring it to the euro. In turn, a high degree of 
dollarisation of the economy strongly increases the likelihood of anchoring the national currency to the 
dollar and appreciably decreases the likelihood of anchoring it to the euro (table 20). 
Table 20 
PROBABILITY OF USING TO AN INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY 
Probit Equations on the Factor Coordinates 
  Dollar Euro Yen 
 Coef. Z-Stat Proba. Coef. Z-Stat Proba. Coef. Z-Stat Proba. 
Constant 1.35 2.82 0.005 -0.45 -1.48 0.139 -1.28 -3.04 0.002 
Direction of trade 
Axis 1 1.45 3.65 0.000 -1.02 -4.50 0.000 -0.26 -2.13 0.034 
Axis 2 2.27 3.38 0.001 -1.35 -3.35 0.001 -1.26 -3.30 0.001 
Axis 3             0.83 2.79 0.005 
Other determinants 
Oil-exporting 1.56 1.87 0.061 -1.67 -2.41 0.016 -0.75 -1.38 0.168 
Dollarised 1.83 2.74 0.006 -0.99 -2.12 0.034 -0.36 -0.86 0.391 
Restr. log likelihood   -54.10     -57.68     -49.16   
Probability(LR stat)   0.00     0.00     0.00   
Obs with Dep=0   27.00     57.00     70.00   
Obs with Dep=1   63.00     31.00     21.00   
Included observations   90.00     88.00     91.00   
McFadden R-squared   0.70     0.60     0.38   
                   
% Correct   95.3%     81.3%     57.1%   
Note: Figures in boldface indicate variables with a significance of at least 90%. 
 
Even more importantly, a final econometric exercise relating the groups of countries and the 
de facto anchoring currencies shows that groups 3 and 4 have a statistically significant relationship 
with the dollar. At the same time, groups 1 and 2 appear to be areas that anchor to a basket (dollar-
euro in group 1, euro-yen in group 2), whereas group 5 is characterized by a statistically significant 
relationship with the euro. The Latin American and Caribbean countries, included mostly in group 
4, are unequivocally part of the dollar zone (table 21). 
Table 21 
GEOGRAPHIC GROUPS AND INTERNATIONAL CURRENCIES 
Probit Equations on The Basis of the Typology 
  Dollar Euro Yen 
 Coef. Z-Stat Proba. Coef. Z-Stat Proba. Coef. Z-Stat Proba. 
Constant -1.16 -2.77 0.006 -0.85 -1.84 0.065 -0.71 -1.42 0.156 
Groups resulting from the typology 
Group 1 1.23 2.75 0.006 0.87 1.80 0.071 0.52 1.01 0.315 
Group 2 Reference   2.56 4.40 0.000 1.34 2.18 0.030 
Group 3 9.56 22.74 0.000 Reference   0.08 0.14 0.889 
Group 4 9.62 22.89 0.000 -0.48 -0.75 0.454 -7.28 -14.89 0.000 
Group 5 0.61 0.98 0.329 1.56 2.70 0.007 Reference   
Other determinants 
Oil-exporting 0.47 1.11 0.269 -0.39 -1.10 0.271 -0.33 -0.91 0.364 
Dollarised 1.07 2.07 0.039 -1.51 -2.68 0.007 -1.08 -2.46 0.014 
Restr. log likelihood   43.56     37.86     24.05   
Probability(LR stat)   0.00     0.00     0.00   
Obs with Dep=0   28.00     59.00     70.00   
Obs with Dep=1   65.00     34.00     23.00   
Included observations   93.00     93.00     93.00   
McFadden R-squared   0.38     0.31     0.23   
% Correct   87.7%     82.4%     21.7%   
Note: Figures in boldface indicate variables with a significance of at least 90%. 
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4. Implications for Latin America 
In spite of their apparent obviousness, the results obtained are not devoid of interest. Our 
evidence confirms the logical assumption that the preeminence of the dollar as an anchor currency 
is favored by inertial factors. In addition, the degree of dollarisation of the economies considered, 
as well as the intensity of the financial and trade relations with the United States, are factors that 
reinforce the role of the dollar as an anchor currency. Thus, virtually none of the of the Latin 
American countries breaks away from the dollar zone. Our analysis shows that the often-mentioned 
"rifts" between Mexico and the countries of Central America, on one the hand, and the countries of 
South America, on the other, have little basis in fact. 
However the use of the euro as the sole anchor currency is clearly confined to countries 
whose trade and financial relations with the European monetary union are very close (group 5 of 
our typology, made up mainly of African and Central/east European countries). As shown by 
Boone and Maurel (1999), for example, for these countries the euro represents a more "natural" 
regional anchor currency than the dollar. In particular, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
and those of North Africa, which conduct a sizeable portion of their trade with the euro zone, 
display activity cycles that coincide quite closely with those of Europe, as well as specialization 
structures that are relatively similar to those of Western Europe. 
Our study also indicates, however, that the euro participates, in numerous cases (groups 1 
and 2 of our typology), in de facto anchoring baskets. This point is important: in a medium- to 
long-term perspective, the euro’s potential for increasing its share in the anchor baskets cannot be 
disregarded. Indeed, another result of this study is that the likelihood of anchoring a national 
currency to the dollar decreases strongly when the share of debts denominated in euros increases. 
Now, as previously noted, since 1997 there has been an increase in the euro-denominated 
bonds as a share of total issues by Latin American countries. Table 22 shows that, for a group of 
selected countries—the largest economies of the region—the use of the euro as a borrowing 
currency is increasing rapidly. More precisely, the euro’s share of government-securities issue has 
reached very high levels in the case of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela. 
On the other hand, as was noted in the second part of this study, the international component 
of private-sector bonds in euros has grown substantially. It is not unlikely, therefore, that Latin 
American firms may tend progressively toward debt issues denominated in euros. The growing 
penetration of the European banks in Latin America, the sustained increase of European banking 
loans to Latin American countries and the boom of foreign investment of European origin in the 
region could intensity this trend. 
Thus, in the medium to long term, the Latin American countries that participate more 
actively in the process of development of the single European currency as a borrowing currency 
might consider the use of the euro as a component of anchor currency baskets. Obviously, the 
dollar would continue to have a preeminent position in these currency baskets, given its 
entrenchment in Latin America. 




DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHARE OF EURO-DENOMINATED  
ISSUES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
  Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela 
Private-sector bond issues 
1993 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 
1994 0.0% 12.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
1995 21.0% 6.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
1996 7.5% 2.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
1997 8.6% 3.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
1998 5.8% 3.6% 0.0% 0.0% 5.4% 0.0% 
1999 29.2% 4.5% 18.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
2000 20.9% 16.8% 0.0% 0.0% 40.1% 0.0% 
Government bond issues 
1993 28.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.5% 14.4% 
1994 22.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
1995 37.8% 34.7% 0.0% 21.1% 12.8% 48.8% 
1996 47.2% 30.5% 0.0% 11.0% 18.7% 68.6% 
1997 28.4% 29.1% 0.0% 0.0% 33.1% 0.0% 
1998 57.0% 32.5% 0.0% 16.0% 16.1% 26.0% 
1999 56.1% 58.3% 0.0% 0.0% 13.9% 54.3% 
2000 51.7% 25.3% 0.0% 36.1% 19.9% 68.5% 
Total bond issues (private-sector+government)  
1993 10.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% 13.8% 
1994 9.9% 11.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
1995 33.3% 15.7% 0.0% 8.8% 11.1% 48.8% 
1996 39.2% 13.6% 0.0% 9.7% 15.7% 68.6% 
1997 22.8% 16.6% 0.0% 0.0% 22.5% 0.0% 
1998 44.3% 17.7% 0.0% 16.0% 11.9% 26.0% 
1999 52.9% 43.2% 12.7% 0.0% 8.3% 54.3% 
2000 47.7% 24.4% 0.0% 36.1% 23.7% 68.5% 
Sources: CDC IXIS, Department of Economic and Financial Analysis,  
Country-Risk and Emerging-Markets Unit, Bondware. 
 
This hypothesis is consistent with the analyses in the theoretical and applied literature on the 
choice of anchor currencies. According to Bénassy-Quéré and Lahrèche-Révil (1999) for instance, 
the relatively diversified geographic patterns of the foreign trade of some of the large Latin 
America countries (except of Mexico) could justify the adoption of a basket including the euro. 
These authors even suggest the hypothesis that countries of the region might create regional 
monetary unions linked to a basket of currencies including the euro. On the strength of our 
findings, we might add that a key factor to increase the possibility of adopting baskets including the 
euro is the intensification of financial relations between Europe and Latin America. 
Undoubtedly, anchoring to a single currency—in this case the dollar—represents a very 
attractive alternative in Latin America. With regard to the prospect of regional monetary unions, 
the unilateral decision to link the national currency to the dollar is an "easy" solution that involves 
fewer demands in terms of regional coordination and cooperation. In addition, full participation in 
the dollar zone may increase foreign investment attracted by exchange-rate risk diversification 
(Bénassy-Quéré, Fontagné and Lahrèche-Révil, 1999). Still more importantly, a policy of 
anchoring to a single key currency can easily be tested by the market. Transparency thus 
contributes to rapidly reinforce the credibility of the countries that adopt this type of policy 
(Frankel et al, 1999). In turn, in Latin America, where the degree of dollarisation is in fact high and 
the question of credibility is crucial to many countries, the issue of the dollar’s role goes beyond 
the discussion of a dollar peg. The debate conducted openly since 1999 is increasingly focused on 
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the advantages and disadvantages of total dollarisation; that is to say, the replacement—in 
principle, irreversible—of the national currencies by the dollar, as has recently occurred in Ecuador 
and El Salvador. 
As long as credibility in Latin America is associated with establishing a close relationship 
with the dollar (in the form of de jure anchoring or floating arrangements involving de facto 
anchoring) and, in some way, to the Federal Reserve, the possibility of adopting baskets including 
the euro will be limited. There are two arguments, however, that can serve to temper this statement: 
1. As indicated by Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1999c), with the launching of the euro, 
the European Central Bank could—if its policy is successful—offer a new alternative in 
the medium or long term to countries in search of credibility. Although both the Federal 
Reserve and the ECB are obviously extremely wary of any proposal to share the 
management of monetary policy with third countries, these authors argue that they might 
be less reluctant to some type of exchange agreement with certain Latin American 
countries. The so-called European Monetary System bis (EMS bis), an exchange 
agreement that links the European Union with other European countries that are applying 
for membership, represents an interesting antecedent—although of course it is 
intrinsically inapplicable to other countries or regions. 
2. The previously-mentioned factors conducive to adoption of anchor baskets could be 
strengthened by the medium- to long-term international scenario that is favored in this 
study. An increasingly bipolar but asymmetrical IMS presupposes high volatility 
between the two main international currencies. In this context, anchoring exclusively to 
the dollar could prove fatal for countries that have major trade and financial relations 
with the euro zone. Conversely, anchoring to a basket that includes the euro would be 
decisive in reducing vulnerability—and, hence, increase credibility—to abrupt 
exchanges-rate swings among the main reference currencies. As already mentioned, this 
was one of the objectives of the decision adopted by Argentina in 2001, which was to 
anchor the peso to a basket made up of the dollar and the euro whenever these two 
currencies achieve a one-to-one exchange-rate11. 
                                                     
11 This text was written before the devaluation of the peso in January 2002 (Note of the Editor) 
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Conclusion 
The internationalization of the euro is in its initial stages and it 
is therefore difficult to draw any definitive conclusions regarding its 
scope and its implications for Latin America. Indeed, as indicated at 
the beginning of this study, the emergence of an internationally used 
currency is slow and subject to inertial forces. Nonetheless, several 
fairly robust conclusions can be inferred from the results of our 
analysis. 
First, with regard to the development of the IMS, if one takes 
into account the initial experience of the euro on the international 
scene and the teachings of economic theory, the most plausible 
medium- to long-term scenario seems to be development of an 
asymmetrical duopoly. This means the euro will come to share the 
dollar’s role as a financial currency, while the U.S. currency will 
continue to prevail in trade transactions12. Even though one can argue 
with this hypothesis, it seems credible that the dollar will maintain its 
dominant position for a considerable time, during which there will be 
a gradually increasing bipolarisation of the IMS.  In a context of scant 
international monetary cooperation, this scenario presupposes high 
volatility between the two main international currencies, which will be 
a powerful destabilizing factor for third countries. 
Secondly, the first two years of the euro's existence confirm that its 
growing use in financial operations—which now far outweight 
 
                                                     
12 An asymmetrical duopoly of rivalry between the dollar and the euro that has both economic and political implications (Cohen, 
2000). Also, as some recent studies suggest (Artus, 2001), the internationalization of the euro—and thus its strengthening—assumes 
a substantial increase in the euro zone’s potential for economic expansion. The latter essentially depends on the zone’s demography 
and capital stock, which implies widening it to include young and undercapitalized countries. 




transactions in goods and services—will represent a decisive vector (although insufficient in the 
long term) in its internationalization. In turn, the effects of the expansion of the euro bond markets 
on the capital markets of the issuing zone are not neutral. Together with other factors, the growth of 
the bond market will tend to increase the pressure to widen and deepen the euro financial market 
and make it more liquid. This should favor the development of better terms for payback period, 
refinancing, coverage and arbitrage conditions for both European and third-country participants. 
Third, a major consequence of the growing financial use of the single European currency and 
the development of Euroland capital markets is that, in terms of official international reserves, this 
should lead to greater diversification in favor of the euro in the medium and long term. Amid the 
ongoing financial deregulation, the currency composition of international reserves seems to be 
strongly affected by the degree of development of the financial markets of the issuing zones of the 
main reference currencies. If this trend is not contradicted by the facts, greater diversification 
favoring the euro’s use as an international reserve currency should tend to reinforce it unit-of-
account function. In the short term, however, it is not likely that the eurocurrency will gain ground 
as a reserve asset; the central banks of the developing countries will to maintain a "wait and see" 
attitude (Galati and Tsatsaronis, 2001). This situation could change if, inter alia, the credibility of 
the European Central Bank were strengthened. This, in turn, is a decisive element in the 
internationalization of the euro. 
Fourth, one of the most relevant aspects in the recent dynamics of European-Latin American 
financial relations, which have intensified greatly since the 1990s, is the expansion of European 
bank loans to Latin America. In the framework of the geographic diversification strategy 
implemented by the European banks, this expansion went hand in hand with a boom in European 
foreign direct investment. Bank financing activities could favor greater international use of the 
euro.  Although most international loans have been extended in dollars up to now, the link between 
bank financing and FDI of European origin could result in greater use of the euro. In fact it is likely 
that there will be greater use of the euro as a relationship currency between parent companies and 
subsidiaries, as well as a greater proportion of credits in the eurocurrency, which could serve to 
reduce or eliminate exchange-rate risks for the companies and banks involved. 
Fifth, the sustained increase in the share of euro-denominated international bond issues, 
chiefly by the Latin American public sector, is another of the distinctive features of the recent 
dynamics of European-Latin American relations. In turn, although euro issues by the Latin 
American private sector have increased substantially over the past two years, they are still at an 
incipient stage. These phenomena, which are part of the boom of the euro-denominated bond 
markets, have several relevant consequences. On one hand, they favor increased liquidity and depth 
of the euro-denominated emerging-bond market, even though—as we saw—this process is in its 
initial stages. On the other, the growing weight of euro-denominated external bonds makes it 
necessary to consider policies for managing the currency composition of the external debt. 
Sixth, the study of the channels for generalizing the use of the different key currencies as 
anchor currencies shows that the likelihood of anchoring a national currency to the dollar decreases 
when the share of a country's external debt denominated in euros increases. If the Latin American 
countries continue to increase their borrowing in euros and this translates into a greater 
diversification of their international reserves, some of them might consider the possibility of using 
the eurocurrency in anchor baskets, especially in those cases where the euro zone is a major trading 
partner. Nevertheless, the dollar will continue to have a preponderant role in those baskets, given 
the entrenchment of the U.S. currency in Latin America. On the other hand, the medium- to long-
term consequences on exchange arrangements will have to be included in the international scenario 
that is beginning to take shape since the creation of the euro. The previously mentioned factors 
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tending to enhance the possibility of adopting anchor baskets (at least in the case of some Latin 
American countries) would be further supported by the medium- to long-term scenario we regard as 
more likely: An increasingly bipolar but asymmetrical IMS presupposes high volatility between the 
two main international currencies. In this context, de facto and de jure anchoring focused 
exclusively on the dollar, which in theory offers substantial gains in terms of credibility, could turn 
out to be fatal for countries that maintain close trade and financial relations with the euro zone. 
In short, the importance of the single European currency for Latin America will depend 
mainly on the speed at which financial links between Latin America and the euro zone intensify. A 
crucial point is the future growth of financing in euros by the private sector in Latin American 
countries. This financing is still modest in absolute terms and is mainly generated by bond issues. 
A continuing dynamism of foreign direct investment and bank loans from Europe to a Latin 
America could intensify the financial relations between the two regions and stimulate a greater use 
of the euro. The factors that would hinder this progression are the inertia that tends to strengthen 
the links with the dollar zone (balance sheets expressed in dollars and following U.S. accounting 
standards, access to financing in the U.S. stock market, etc.) and the possibility that the growth of 
the capital markets of the euro zone will be slower than currently expected. The intensification of 
financial relations between Europe and Latin America will obviously also depend on expectations 
concerning the financial costs and exchange-rate risks associated with the euro. In this framework, 
an issue that merits further study is the question of which borrowing currencies will be used in 
European bank loans to the Latin American private sector. Another point to examine is how the 
large European corporations operating in Latin America will react to the widening use of the euro. 
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Annexe I 
Method of calculation of de facto arrangements and their results 
The most frequently used method to identify a de facto arrangement consists in estimating an 
equation that explains the exchange-rate variations of each currency by means of the exchange-rate 
fluctuations of the major reference currencies (dollar, yen, mark, euro, etc.): 
uteYktaeEktae ktaaeikt ++++= !!!! 32$10  
where, eikt! = designates the exchange rate variation of currency i in relation to currency k 
between t and t—1. $, E and Y designate the dollar, the euro and the yen, respectively. 
The constant a0  is positive if i is depreciated (or devalued) regularly to compensate for a 
positive inflation differential (case of real anchors or crawling pegs). Coefficients a j  are 
interpreted as the weight of each reference currency in the implicit basket of country i. 
The cases that can arise are: 1=aij , which represents unit anchoring in relation to one 
currency (a single significant coefficient, equal to the unit); 10 << aij , which represents anchoring 
to a basket of currencies (at least two significant coefficients, where the sum is equal to the unit); 
∀= jija  for 0 , which represents a free float (no coefficient is different from zero). 
As the direct estimate of the equation poses the problem of defining the numeraire k (a 
currency that fluctuates independently from the major explanatory currencies), Bénassy-Quéré and 
Coeuré use: 
uX itiiti += βα '  
where, ( )eeeX iYtiEttiit !!! ,,$= , α i  represents the weighting vector and β i  is a scalar. 
The equation is estimated as a condition of orthogonality using the generalised-moment 








The estimate was made for 111 currencies, on the basis of weekly exchange rates and 
covering two periods: April 1995 to June 1997 (prior to the Asian crisis) and October 1998 to 
December 1999 (after the crisis). The euro was identified with the ecu prior to January 1999. Of the 
111 countries used by Bénassy-Quéré and Cœuré, the following 93 were selected for this study. 
 




EXCHANGE RATE ARRANGEMENTS: COUNTRIES INCLUDES IN THE SAMPLE 
Argentina Cote d'Ivoire Honduras Mexico Slovakia 
Bangladesh Croatia Hungary Mongolia South Korea 
Barbados Czech Republic India Morocco Sri Lanka 
Benin Djibouti Indonesia Mozambique Syria 
Bolivia Dominica Iran Nepal Tanzania 
Brazil Dominican Rep. Jamaica Nicaragua Thailand 
Bulgaria Ecuador Jordan Niger The Gambia 
Burkina Faso Egypt Kazakhstan Nigeria Togo 
Burundi El Salvador Kenya Pakistan Trinidad and Tobago 
Cambodia Equatorial Guinea Laos Panama Tunisia 
Cameroon Estonia Latvia Paraguay Turkey 
Central African Rep. Ethiopia Lebanon Peru Ukraine 
Chad Gabon Lithuania Philippines Uruguay 
Chile Ghana Madagascar Poland Venezuela 
China Grenada Malawi Romania Vietnam 
Colombia Guatemala Malaysia Russian Federation Zambia 
Comoros Guinea–Bissau Mali Senegal Zimbabwe 
Congo Guyana Mauritania Seychelles  
Costa Rica Haiti Mauritius Sierra Leone   
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Annexe II 
Principal component factor analysis (PCFA) 
Principal component factor analysis makes it possible to represent numerous relations 
between variables in a small number of factors. The observations (or individuals) can be 
represented (projected) on a plane defined by the factor axes. 
This quantitative method adjusts better to the analysis of a group of heterogeneous variables, 
i.e., expressed in units that are a priori different. Standardising each variable eliminates the 
arbitrariness resulting from the use of different measuring scales, which is expressed in a non-
comparable dispersion. Thus, each variable has a variance that is equal to 1. For J variables, the 
total variance (that measures the overall dispersion of the individuals resulting from all variables) is 
equal to J. 
Geometrically, the variables are represented by points situated on a sphere. The angle 
between two variables illustrates the correlation between them (Bravais-Pearson's linear correlation 
coefficient): this is the cosine of the angle. The correlation is more strongly positive when the angle 
is acute and more strongly negative when the angle is obtuse. The correlation is null when the two 
variables form a right angle. 
The PCFA provides an orderly group of axes and corresponding eigenvalues. Eigenvalue n° 
α is the variance of the factor corresponding to axis α. The sum of the eigenvalues is always equal 
to the total variance. If the original variables all have a variance that is equal to 1 (by construction), 
the first factors will have a variance that is notably greater than 1: each of them embodies the 
disparity of observations attributable to a group of variables. As of a certain range, the factors 
associate with eigenvalues that are lower than 1. Thus, these last factors express less disparity 
between individuals than any of the original variables; this leads us to consider that the information 
they provide in terms of disparity between individuals is residual and, therefore, allows us to 
eliminate them from the result-interpretation process. 
The factor coordinates of individuals (projections on the factor axes) can be used as new 
(compound) variables in econometric equations. These variables, that summarise the information 
contained in the original group of variables, present orthogonality as a fundamental characteristic, 
i.e. they eliminate all risk of multicollinearity. 
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